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                                                               ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
                    SIMULATION MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF  
                                                  BORDER SECURITY SYSTEM  
 
 
          Gökhan Çelik  
                                                      M.S. in Industrial Engineering 
                                             Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. İhsan Sabuncuoğlu 
                                                                    July, 2002 
 
 
Border control is vital to the security of the nation and its citizens. Hence, states all 
around the world look at measures to increase the security of their borders. On the other 
hand, increasing border security also brings significant financial costs. 
In this study, the performance of a Border Company is analyzed by simulation 
modeling of the operational activities of a Border Company supported by Border Battalion.  
Our main objective is to find out more efficient ways of increasing border control and 
security along the land borders of Turkey. To achieve this objective, we examine the border 
security system structure and its components, observe the relationships between 
performance measures, and find out effects of security elements on the system performance 
measures. We also investigate system responses when changes implemented in the system 
or new resources added, evaluate different alternatives that improve the performance 
measures by using ranking/selection and multi-criteria decision-making procedures. The 
model is developed by using ARENA simulation system and the results are analyzed by 
using SPSS statistical package program. A comprehensive bibliography is also provided in 
the thesis. 
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                                                                        ÖZET 
 
                                HUDUT GÜVENLİK SİSTEMİNİN SİMÜLASYONLA       
                                                MODELLENMESİ VE ANALİZİ 
 
 
       Gökhan Çelik 
                                         Endüstri Mühendisliği Bölümü Yüksek Lisans 
                                             Danışman: Doç. Dr. İhsan Sabuncuoğlu 
       Temmuz 2002 
 
 
 
 
  
Sınır kontrolu bir millet ve vatandaşlarının güvenliği için hayati öneme sahiptir. Bu 
sebeple, dünyadaki tüm devletler sınırlarının güvenliğini artırmak için önlemler  
aramaktadırlar. Diğer taraftan, sınır güvenliğini artırmak önemli maliyetler getirmektedir. 
Bu çalışmada, Hudut Taburu tarafından desteklenen bir Hudut Bölüğü’nün harekata 
yönelik faaliyetleri modellenerek, Hudut Bölüğü’nün performansı analiz edilmektedir. Ana 
hedefimiz, Türkiye’nin kara sınırları boyunca sınır güvenliğini ve kontrolunu artırmak için 
daha etkin yöntemler ortaya çıkarmaktır. Bu amacımıza ulaşmak için, hudut güvenlik 
sisteminin yapısı ve bu sistemin bileşenleri incelenmekte, performans ölçütleri arasındaki 
ilişkiler gözlemlenmekte ve güvenlik elemanlarının sistem performans ölçütleri üzerindeki 
etkisi tespit edilmektedir. Ayrıca, sistemde değişiklikler yapıldığında veya yeni kaynaklar 
ilave edildiğinde sistemdeki etkileri incelenmekte, performans ölçütlerini geliştiren değişik 
alternatifler sıralama/seçme ve çok amaçlı karar verme yöntemleriyle 
değerlendirilmektedir. Model ARENA simülasyon programı kullanılarak hazırlanmıştır. 
İlgili referanslar tezde verilmiş bulunmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Askeri Simülasyon, Hudut Güvenliği 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
It is a well-known fact that the border control is vital to the security of the nation 
and its citizens. The threat of international terrorism, worldwide illegal immigration and 
refugee problems, drug and arms smuggling are issues of that concerns states. Therefore, 
all states in the world look at measures to increase security at their borders. They apply 
different organizations and methods to protect their borders. But the main resources are 
technology and personnel. Therefore, increasing border security is only possible by 
increasing resources or improving methods. On the other hand, increasing resources 
causes significant financial costs. 
In our thesis, we investigate the possible ways of increasing border control and 
security along the land borders of Turkey. First, we present brief information about how 
Turkey protects her land borders.  
 
 
1.1 .   Protection and Security of Land Borders in Turkey 
 
Turkey has land borders of 2852 kilometers long with neighbor countries (202 km 
with Greece, 268 km with Bulgaria, 877 km with Syria, 378 km with Iraq, 528 km with 
Iran, 17 km with Nahcıvan, 325 km with Armenia and 257 km with Georgia). In Turkey, 
the task of protection of land borders and providing security along the borders was given 
to the Land Forces by law at 10.11.1988. This task is executed by Border Troops. 
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1.1.1.  Tasks of Border Troops 
             The tasks of border troops are as follows: 
             Peace Time 
• To protect the land borders and to provide security along the borders in its            
responsibility terrain. 
• To prevent smuggling and related illegal activities. 
• To prevent trans-borders crimes unauthorized entry into or exit from the 
territory of Turkey (such as illegal infiltrations of refugees, terrorists, 
smugglers, enemy special forces). 
• To coordinate with civil administration. 
• To get prepared for war according to general defense plans. 
• Collection of intelligence.             
 
  War Time 
• To execute tasks according to general defense plans. 
? To hold ground in less threatened sectors so long as the main 
attack does not develop in a particular sector.         
? Protection of vital installations against enemy commandos and 
paratroop raids. 
 
Border troops execute their tasks under the light of laws, regulations, and rules of 
our country, and treaties or protocols with the neighbor nations’ administrations. 
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1.1.2.  Organization and Deployment of Border Troops   
Border troops are organized by the proposals of Land Forces and approval of the 
General Staff. Each border troop may have different organizations, which are determined 
by order. Main organization scheme is shown in Figure 1.1. Border battalions consist of 
three border companies and one headquarters company. Headquarters company supports 
the activities of border battalion commander and his headquarters. It also provides 
logistic support for border companies. Border companies are operational troops of border 
battalion. It can be said that the main force that protects the land borders of Turkey are 
border companies. Border companies consist of three border platoons and one center 
platoon. Center platoon supports border company headquarters. Operational tasks such as 
patrol and ambush are executed by border platoons. Sometimes center platoon supports 
border platoons. Border troops are equipped with new technology and supported by 
personnel to execute their tasks best. 
Border troops are located in such a way that they execute their tasks best under 
peace and war conditions. Any change of locations is under the authority of General 
Staff. Unless permission is given, no change can be done in the location of border posts. 
           Brigade commanders determine the responsibility terrains of border troops. 
Basically, border platoons (border posts) are located along the borders and border 
companies that direct and manage the border platoons are located behind the platoons, 
lastly border battalions are located behind the border companies. The scheme of 
deployment is shown in Figure 1.2. 
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                                            Center platoon             Border Platoons 
 
 
Figure 1.1.  Main organization scheme of Border Troops 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The scheme of deployment 
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1.2.   Border Security System 
 
Border Security System consists of physical obstacles system and border 
surveillance and controlling system. These complementary systems can be used as a 
whole or they can be used partially depending on needs and possibilities. At this point, 
the importance of the region, threat and structure of the terrain are considered.  
The Ministries of Defense and Home Affairs are also responsible for installing 
and maintenance of the physical obstacles system. These obstacles are: 
• Fences along the borders, barbed wires (8 meters width along the borders). 
• Track fields (7 meters width along the borders). 
• Ways for patrols and illumination area (7 meters width along the borders). 
            
Border surveillance and controlling system is the main part of the border security 
system. Because it contains all active precautions against unauthorized entry into or exit 
from the territory of Turkey. It is the basic means of providing security along the borders. 
Border Patrols, ambushes, sentries, thermal cameras and askarad are the main elements 
of this system.  
   Border Patrols: A patrol consists of three soldiers (one of them is the commander 
of the patrol) and they execute their tasks by watching and controlling the areas on their 
route along the borders. These soldiers belong to border platoons and they leave for task 
from border posts in some time intervals, execute their tasks and return border posts. 
They control the borders under day and night conditions. 
  Ambushes: An ambush consists of five-six soldiers under the command of 
commissioned or non-commissioned officer. Ambushes may be stationary or mobile. If 
they are stationary, they go to the place where they control the area through the night. If 
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they are mobile they change their places after execution of their task at one place. They 
change their places 3 or 4 times and they stay at one place no more than 2-3 hours. 
Ambushes may be equipped with night-vision devices. If they have night-vision devices, 
the area that they control gets wider. Ambushes execute their tasks under night 
conditions. 
Sentries: Their main task is to watch the borderlines and enemy terrain. They 
execute their tasks at watchtowers, which are constructed at some specific places along 
the borders. Sentries are on duty under day conditions. Watching duty is executed by 
using electronic systems such as askarad and thermal cameras under night conditions. 
Thermal Cameras: Thermal Camera System is an infrared imaging system, which 
enables the user target detection, recognition and observation capabilities in all weather 
conditions. The passive nature of imaging provides fully covert surveillance. Light-
weight and portable structure, operability by one man, operability with 12-24 VDC 
sealed lead acid battery or 220 VAC at stationary applications, minimum focusing range, 
uninterrupted operation capability without being affected from poor field and weather 
conditions, low noise level and perfect imaging make thermal camera an ideal system for 
military purposes. Thermal cameras are used for; border surveillance, protection of 
headquarters, military zones and port/harbor surveillance. Thermal Cameras are under 
the control of Border Company. They can be used only under night conditions, stationary 
or mobile. 
Askarad: Askarad, ground surveillance radar, is a new generation radar system 
used for surveillance of moving targets and for artillery fire adjustment in the battlefield. 
Askarad combines surveillance, target acquisition and classification, target tracking and 
artillery fire adjustment functions within one unit. Askarad is used for; surveillance, 
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target acquisition and moving target classification, precision location of targets, plotting 
of targets on the display, adjustment of artillery fire, guidance of small ground or 
airborne attack units, helicopter navigational aid especially for homing. Askarads are 
under the control of Border Battalion. They can be used under day and night conditions, 
as stationary or mobile. 
Both thermal camera and askarad are electronic surveillance systems. Main 
difference between them is the range that they are capable of control. Askarad is capable 
of detecting targets from 4-5 times farther than that of thermal camera. 
 
1.3.    Objectives and Scope of the Thesis 
In this thesis, our main aim is to investigate how to increase border control and 
efficiency of border security along the borders of Turkey. To achieve our purpose, we 
model the operational activities of border company supported by border battalion via 
simulation. We first study border security system structure and its components. At this 
stage, our aim is to assess the effectiveness of the system in terms of performance 
measures such as the ratio of illegal infiltrations caught, degree of controllability and 
frequency of controlling. Secondly, we attempt to understand the relationship between 
security elements and performance measures. In other words, we observe the behavior of 
the system and interactions of security elements and performance measures closer. 
Thirdly, we investigate effect of each security element on the performance measures and 
find out the degree of importance of each security element. Fourthly, we analyze the 
significant factors that affect the performance measures. Fifthly, we investigate system 
responses, when changes made in the system or new resources added to the system. 
Lastly, we evaluate different alternatives that increase the performance measures, by 
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using ranking, selection and multi-criteria decision-making procedures. At the end, we 
hope to find possible ways of increasing border security by a simulation model of the 
system that can be used before implementing real investments in the system or real 
decisions about the system. 
The outline of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review 
about border security systems in the world, simulation methodologies and military 
simulations. In Chapter 3, we give the simulation model of border security system.  
Verification and validation issues are also discussed in this section. In Chapter 4, the 
system behavior is examined, the interactions of system components and performance 
measures are found out and effects of each security element on the performance measures 
are investigated. Chapter 5 presents experimental design and implementation of analysis 
of variance procedure to find out the significant factors that affect the performance 
measures. In Chapter 6, alternatives are examined, compared and they are ranked and 
selected by using ranking and selection procedures and multi-objective decision-making 
procedures. Chapter 7 gives conclusion of the study and future research directions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Literature  Review 
 
During our literature review, we search for the studies or researches that are 
related with analysis of border security systems via simulation. We also search for how 
to increase border security. Although there are some official studies those are about 
precautions taken for more secure borders, we couldn’t meet any study that simulation 
tool is used in the analysis of border security systems in the literature. Furthermore, we 
observe that the border security systems vary from country to country, but the basic 
components and operational activities of the systems are similar. Thus, we first give 
information about border security systems from other countries and precautions taken for 
more secure borders. Then, since we use simulation tool to analyze our border security 
system, we search for simulation methodology and software. We also review the military 
simulation studies to learn how to deal with the subject and to overcome the problems.  
 
 
2.1. Border Security in the World 
During our survey, we examine how the other countries protect their land borders. 
There are mainly three kinds of organization that countries apply to protect their land 
borders. One of them is giving this task to the Army. This method is used in our country 
and in our neighbor countries. The second method is performing this task by state 
organizations rather than Army. These organizations are under the control of civil 
administration. An example of this method is U.S. Border Patrol organization that is 
under the control of Immigration and Naturalization Service of Department of Justice. 
Sometimes these organizations are supported by Army. The third method is execution of 
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this task by Police Forces. At wartime, these forces are under the operational control of 
the Army. But at the peacetime, they are under the control of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. This method is applied in India and this organization is called as Border Security 
Force. 
As seen, when the border security is the subject under concern, the main 
ministries, departments and armed forces of the states have responsibilities for security of 
country borders. Therefore, besides many news those are related with border security of 
countries from all around the world such as declarations of researches for more secure 
borders or precautions and results of precautions in both technological and organizational 
issues, we meet some official reports related with border security. 
There are several reports of GAO (General Accounting Office is the investigative 
arm of Congress in U.S.) and CRS (Congressional Research Service) related with border 
control and security. 
In their CRS report (June 18, 2001), William J. Krouse (Analyst in Social 
Legislation; Domestic Social Policy Division) and Raphael F. Perl (Specialist in 
International Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) explain the 
importance of border security and propose some options to prevent illegal entry into the 
United States. 
In GAO reports, after making studies about border security, precautions are 
proposed and results of precautions are evaluated. As precautions for strengthening the 
border, (1) concentrating personnel and technology resources, starting first with the 
sectors with the highest level of illegal infiltration activity and moving to the areas with 
the least activity, (2) making maximum use of physical barriers to deter entry along the 
border, (3) increasing the proportion of time Border Patrol agents spent on border control 
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activities and (4) identifying the appropriate quantity and mix of technology and 
personnel needed to control the border, are proposed in some parts of GAO reports. 
  
2.2. Simulation Methodology and Software 
We use simulation tool to analyze border security system. Throughout our study, 
we use the basic principles, which are stated in Shannon (1998), Banks (1998) and Mehta 
(2000). In these studies, they explain how a complex simulation study of any discrete 
system be executed efficiently and effectively following simple basic methodology. 
Sargent (1999) discusses validation and verification of simulation models and 
different approaches are presented to decide model validity. Robinson (1997) sets 
simulation model verification and validation in the context of the process of performing a 
simulation study. Balcı (1998) presents guidelines for conducting verification, validation 
and accreditation of simulation models. Fifteen guiding principles are introduced and 
many verification and validation techniques are presented. We verify and validate our 
model by using techniques and considering the principles of Balcı (1998) for all steps of 
our study. 
Centeno and Reyes (1998) explain several concepts and techniques to analyze 
output of the simulation model. Kelton (1997) explain methods to help design the runs 
for simulation models and interpreting their outputs. Again, Kelton (1999) introduces 
some of the ideas, issues, challenges, and opportunities in deciding how to experiment 
with a simulation model to learn about its behavior. Montgomery (1992) explains design 
and analysis of experimental design in his book. We use these studies in output analysis 
and experimental design parts of our study. 
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Swisher and Jacobson (1999) presents a survey of the literature for two widely-
used statistical methods for selecting the best design from among a finite set of k 
alternatives: ranking and selection and multiple comparison procedures. We use some of 
the methods stated in this study in evaluation of alternatives.  
Takus and Profozich (1997) explain that the Arena software is a flexible and 
powerful tool that allows analysts to create animated simulation models that accurately 
represent virtually any system. In our study, we use Arena software because of its desired 
properties. 
 
2.3. Military Simulation 
Hill, Miller and McIntyre (2001) describe the military as a big user of discrete 
event simulation models. They discuss the uses of military simulation and the issues 
associated with military simulation to include categorizations of various types of military 
simulation. 
Garrabrants (1998) proposes an expansion of simulation system’s role to support 
all levels of command and control functioning, especially staff planning after receipt of 
orders and mission rehearsal. He points out that simulation system is a natural solution to 
the commander’s need for a planning and rehearsal system to support his operational 
planning efforts. 
Smith (1998) identifies and explores the essential techniques for modern military 
training simulations. His study provides a brief historical introduction followed by 
discussions of system architecture, simulation interoperability, event and time 
management, verification and validation and fundamental principles in modeling and 
specific military domains. 
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Roland (1998) presents a panel of knowledgeable individuals who are filling 
those decision-making roles. Major problems in the current state of modeling and 
simulation development and use, major modeling and simulation opportunities and 
challenges are discussed in the panel “The future of military simulation”. He categorizes 
the military modeling and simulation as engineering models, analysis models and 
training models. 
Chew and Sullivan (2000) discusses the activities and tasks during the early 
stages of model development and addresses each of the verification, validation and 
accreditation efforts separately, along with its associated activities. Balcı, Ormsby, Carr 
and Saadi (2000) provide guidance in developing and executing a comprehensive and 
detailed verification, validation and accreditation plan throughout the entire modeling 
and simulation application development life cycle. Hartley (1997) explains verification 
and validation in military simulations and discusses the cost aspect of verification and 
validation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Simulation Model 
3.1. Formulation of the Problem and Planning the Study 
One of the most important aspects of simulation study is a careful statement of 
the objectives. Our main objective is to investigate how to increase border control and 
efficiency of border security along the borders of Turkey. We think that the use of 
simulation and statistical procedures analyzing the border security system will help to 
achieve our main objective. We have other objectives to achieve. These are: to make a 
thorough examination of the border security system structure and its components, 
observe the relationships between performance measures, analyze factors that effect the 
performance measures, find out the ways to increase the performance measures, and 
investigate system responses when changes made in the system or addition of resources 
made to the system to improve the performances. 
 As we already know, it is always preferable to use analytical models whenever 
possible. At first glance optimization models seem to be available for the modeling and 
solution of the system. But border security system has dynamic behavior that the system 
state changes over time. If we look from the point of performance measures, optimization 
model will give solution for only one performance measure that is the maximum length 
of border that could be under control with our resources one at a time. But our 
performance measures depend on time, moving characteristics of security elements and 
catching of illegal infiltrations that all these measures have stochastic features. As we 
mention in objective statement of our study, our objectives are mostly related with 
behavior examination of the border security system and its components. We also try to 
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investigate a wide variety of  “what if ” questions about our system to improve the 
performance measures. Consequently, when we look from the aspects of border security 
system characteristics (i.e. dynamic behavior of system, stochastic features of events), 
performance measures to be evaluated and objectives that motivate us to make such a 
study, simulation is appropriate tool for our study.  
 
            The Border Security System Model is developed to: 
• Make it possible for border security planners to model the responsibility terrain of 
border troops with different deployment, organization, terrain conditions and 
resources. 
• Analyze performance of border troops along the borders in their responsibility 
terrain in terms of performance measures. 
• Make it easy to find the strong and weak sides along the borders. 
• Help to see the results of precautions that are taken for weak points or to increase 
the security in the responsibility terrain of troops. 
• Display the effect of each type of security element on the performance measures 
and allow determining priority for drilling and maintenance. 
• Perform new policies, changes of organization or deployment before conducting 
real decisions about the system. 
• Perform cost management before conducting real investments. 
 
By using this model, border security planners, border troop commanders can 
accurately and efficiently examine the behavior of the system; they can easily see the 
results of their precautions and use the model as a support of their decision-making 
process. We try to answer the following research questions: 
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1. How efficient is the system if we consider the performance measures? 
2. What are the relationships between security elements and performance measures? 
3. What are the relationships between performance measures? 
4. How much does each element effect performance measures? 
5. What are the significant factors that affect the performance measures? 
6. How much does it affect the system if coordination is established between 
security elements? 
7. How much do additional resources affect the performance measures of the 
system? 
8. Which parts of the border are strong and weak in terms of performance measures? 
 
          Explanation of Performance Measures: 
          There are mainly three performance measures as an output of the system: 
1. Degree of Controllability (DOC) is the ratio of time that a zone is under control 
by security elements in one-year time period. After it is calculated for each zone, 
the average of all zones is considered as a performance measure. 
2. Frequency of Controlling (FOC) shows how many different times any zone gets 
under control by security elements in one-year time period. After it is calculated 
for each zone the average of all zones is taken as a performance measure. 
3. Ratio of Illegal Infiltrations Caught (ROIIC) shows the ratio of number caught 
illegal infiltrations to the total number of caught and couldn’t be caught 
infiltrations in one-year time period. The average of all zones is considered as a 
performance measure. 
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Input/Output Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(*)Decision variables and parameters 
    are given in Table 3.1 p.31. 
 
 X                                                                          Y 
 
 
Outputs of the model are the functions of random variables presented in Table 
3.1. Among these random variables duty time of each security element, failures of high-
tech devices, determination of duty places are the main random variables that affect the 
degree-of-controllability output whereas determination that patrols are motorized or on-
foot and determination of mobile or stationary characteristics of duty are the main 
random variables that affect the frequency-of-controlling output. Arrivals of illegal 
infiltrations, infiltration time for each type of illegal infiltrations affect ratio-of-illegal-
infiltrations-caught. But, the ratio-of-illegal-infiltrations-caught performance measure is 
also affected by random variables that affect the degree-of-controllability and the 
frequency-of-controlling performance measures. Briefly, when we consider the 
operational behavior of the border security system with its all components, each decision 
variable and parameter has an effect on each performance measure. 
 
• *Decision 
variables 
• *Parameters 
Simulation  
Model 
1. Degree of 
controllability (DOC) 
2. Frequency of 
controlling (FOC) 
3. Ratio of illegal 
infiltrations caught 
(ROIIC) 
Real Life 
Y=f(X) 
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Other performance measures that the model is capable of evaluating:   
• Number of illegal infiltrations caught by type (refugees, terrorists, smugglers, 
enemy special forces and enemy commando troops). 
• Number of illegal infiltrations that couldn’t be caught by type. 
• Number of security elements (askarad, patrols, thermal camera, ambushes) that 
served during a year. 
• Contributions of each security element to the system performance measures. 
Data needs and stochastic factors are analyzed in the input data analysis section. 
 
3.2.  Model Development 
First we develop a conceptual model of the system. At this stage, we determine 
the parts of real-world system to be modeled to achieve our objectives. If we think the 
border troops in real world, they have many activities other than border security. But all 
other activities support the main task that is protection and security of borders. Thus, our 
conceptual model is about the operational activities that border troops perform for 
security of borders. We model the operational activities of border company supported by 
border battalion. Based on this conceptual model, we then develop our logical and 
simulation model. Figure 3.1 shows the schematic view of border security system model 
development. 
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Figure 3.1. Schematic view of border security system model development 
 
 3.2.1.  Conceptual Model 
 At this stage, we determine elements of system, their relationships, assumptions 
and data requirements of the simulation model. 
      Entities of the system: 
• Patrols. 
• Ambushes. 
• Thermal camera. 
• Askarad. 
• Illegal infiltrations. 
• Zones. 
 
          Attributes of the system: 
• The departure time of security elements from their locations. 
• Type of illegal infiltrations. 
 
REAL WORLD 
SYSTEM:Border 
Troops 
ASSUMED 
SYSTEM:Border 
Company 
supported by 
Border Battalion 
CONCEPTUAL 
MODEL:Operational 
Activities for Security 
of Borders
LOGICAL 
MODEL:Flowchart 
SIMULATION 
MODEL: Siman 
programming 
language/ARENA 
Simulation Package 
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• Duty time for each security elements. 
• Using of night-vision tools by ambushes. 
• Patrol type. 
• Moving or stationary characteristics of security elements. 
• Security element type. 
 
            Events of the system: 
• Departure of security elements from their locations. 
• Arrivals of illegal infiltrations. 
• Catching of illegal infiltrations. 
• Changing places of duty for askarad, thermal camera and ambushes if they are 
moving. 
• Failures before and during operation of askarad and thermal camera. 
• Controlling of zones by patrols on their route. 
• Controlling of zones by askarad, thermal camera and ambushes. 
• Ending of duty and returning to locations. 
 
           Activities of the system: 
• Controlling of zones by each security element. 
• Illegal infiltrations. 
 
       Exogenous Variables (Input variables) 
• Decision variables (controllable variables) and parameters (uncontrollable 
variables) are listed in the input data analysis section. 
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             Endogenous Variables (Output variables): 
 State Variables: 
• State of zones (under control or not). 
• Number of illegal infiltrations caught for each type. 
• Number of security elements in the system. 
 Performance measures: 
• Degree of controllability. 
• Frequency of controlling. 
• Ratio of illegal infiltrations caught. 
 
           The assumptions of our model are: 
• The system is considered under night conditions. 
• The responsibility terrain of a typical border company is considered. 
• There are four platoons directed by border company. 
• Each border platoon has approximately 4-6 kilometers responsibility terrain. 
• There is one thermal camera belonging to border company. 
• There is one askarad belonging to border battalion and it serves to three border 
companies. Askarad is under consideration when it comes to responsibility terrain 
of border company that is in the model. 
• Two of border platoons have capability of patrolling for two sides of its location. 
Two of them have capability for one side. 
• There is no intelligence of any infiltration. 
• Each zone is considered as an area that can be controlled by patrol. 
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            Night conditions vs. day conditions 
We model the border security system under night conditions. Because, most of 
the operational activities of border troops are performed under night conditions. 
Electronic surveillance systems (askarad, thermal camera), ambushes equipped with 
night-vision tools and patrols are the main security elements used for border control 
under night conditions. On the other hand, sentries and patrols under day conditions 
perform border control. Since the visibility is high under day conditions, sentries 
stationed at watchtowers control wide part of border. Therefore, control of border under 
day conditions is too high. Moreover, illegal infiltrations (terrorists, smugglers, refugees 
and enemy forces) try to infiltrate under night conditions. Because, they want to take the 
advantage of poor visibility of night not to be caught by our security elements. To 
prevent illegal infiltrations along the border, active precautions are taken under night 
conditions. This is possible only by using technology and personnel (askarad, thermal 
camera, ambushes and patrols) more frequently under night conditions. Thus, the real 
border security system operates under night conditions with its all components. This is 
why we model the system under night conditions rather than day conditions. 
 System is non-terminating system since there is no event that determines the end 
of simulation run-length. Hence, we perform steady-state simulation. We will explain 
determination of run-length of the simulation in Chapter 4. 
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3.2.2.  Logical Model (Flowchart Model of the System) 
By examining the relationship among elements, we construct our logical model. It 
starts with departure of security elements from their locations and ends with returning to 
their start locations. At the same time, the arrivals of illegal infiltrations are considered. 
The relations between these entities and events are modeled and presented in Figures 3.2-
3.7 as flowcharts. In Figure 3.2 departure of security elements from their locations by 
type and arrivals of illegal infiltrations are presented and they are labeled by numbers to 
which logical model they follow. The rest of the Figure 3.2 is the general flowchart 
model of the system. Security elements leave their locations for duty according to 
weather conditions and failure conditions of high-tech devices. Meanwhile, type of duty 
(stationary or moving) and duty places are determined. Then, since there are four security 
elements, their relations according to existence of another element in the zone or arriving 
of any security element while another one is in that zone are presented. Again, we use 
labels to determine the rest of the logical flow that security elements and illegal 
infiltrations follow when they meet with such a situation. At last, if security elements 
complete their duty, they go back to their locations and if not, new duty places are 
determined and they go on duty. This continues until security element completes its duty.  
Figures 3.3-3.6 present flowcharts of askarad, thermal camera, ambushes and patrols 
sequentially. Figure 3.7 presents flowchart of illegal infiltrations.  
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                  Figure 3.2. The General Flowchart of the Logical Model  
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security element will follow 
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in the detailed flowchart. 
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                      Figure 3.3. The Flowchart of Askarad 
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                          Figure 3.4. The Flowchart of Thermal Camera         
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           Figure 3.5. The Flowchart of Patrols 
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            Figure 3.6. The Flowchart of Ambushes  
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 Figure 3.7. The Flowchart of Illegal Infiltrations  
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3.2.3.  Simulation Model (Computer Code) 
Border troops are like factories that production is security service provided for 
borders. In other words, border troops produce security service along the land borders of 
our country. Border security system differs from typical manufacturing systems since it 
does not contain queuing models or the production of the system is not material. 
Although, when we consider some aspects  it differs, we can handle the border security 
system as a mixture of manufacturing and military systems. We know that Arena 
software is very popular manufacturing simulation software with its flexible usage. 
Therefore, we use Arena software. It is useful to model border security system with its 
flexibility beyond it is a well-known manufacturing system simulation software and it 
gives a wide opportunities to evaluate the system performances under different 
conditions. The computer codes occupy 6.81 MB without animation, the animation at a 
level of border platoon 9.46 MB and the animation of border company 8.44 MB. We 
animate all details at a level of border platoon. One run without animation takes 
approximately 55 seconds. We present some parts of the codes of model in Appendix F. 
 
3.3.  Input Data Analysis 
There are several random variables in the model. These variables and their 
distribution functions are given in Table 3.1. The parameters of these distribution 
functions can be found in Appendix G. In Appendix G, the detailed explanation about 
input data is also presented. In general, we use data taken from army field manuals and 
established statistics that gained by experiences. The controllable and uncontrollable 
variables of the model are seen in Table 3.1 too. The ones signed with check are 
controllable variables and the others are uncontrollable variables of the model. 
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Table 3.1. Random variables and their distribution functions 
 
 
Random Variables Distribution Functions 
Table numbers that 
contain parameters 
arrivals of illegal infiltrations. exponential G.1 
type of illegal infiltrations. discrete G.2 
infiltration time for each type of illegal 
infiltration. triangular G.3 
? duty time of patrols (according to 
motorized or on-foot) triangular G.4 
duty time of ambush, thermal camera and 
askarad  (according to stationary or mobile). triangular G.5 
duty time when  failure occurred. uniform G.6 
weather conditions. discrete G.7 
failures before duty. discrete G.8 
? determination of mobile or stationary 
characteristics of duty. discrete G.9 
? determination that patrols are 
motorized or on-foot (for each 
platoon). 
discrete G.10 
? determination that ambushes with 
night vision device or not. discrete G.11 
? the degree of use of high-tech 
devices. discrete G.12 
determination of which zone ambush will go 
first (for each platoon). discrete G.13a-13d 
determination of which zone thermal camera 
will go first. discrete G.14 
determination of which zone askarad will go 
first. discrete G.15 
determination of which zone will thermal go, 
if it has mobile characteristic after  end of 
duty at any zone. 
discrete G.16 
determination of which zone will askarad go, 
if it has mobile characteristic after  end of 
duty at any zone. 
discrete G.17 
determination of which zone will ambush 
go, if it has mobile characteristic after  end 
of duty at any zone. 
discrete G.18a-18p 
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3.4.  Model Verification and Validation      
Verification and validation phase is vital for any simulation study. Because any 
conclusions derived from the model that is not verified and validated will be doubtful. 
We verify and validate our model by using some techniques and considering the 
principles of Balcı (1998) for all steps of our study. 
 
3.4.1. Verification of Model 
Verification is determining that a simulation computer program performs as 
intended. In other words, by using verification techniques we will check the translation 
of the conceptual model into a correctly working program. 
• Tracing: By using Arena trace option, we can observe the state of our model. 
The state variables, statistical counters are printed out just after each event occurs. 
Thus, we can easily check if the program is operating as intended. 
• Writing and Debugging in Modules and Subprograms: Border security system 
model contains four border platoons. Each border platoon means different 
subprograms. We check the code while developing  each subprogram and find 
location of errors easily in the code and correct. Then we add levels of detail and 
check them until the model accurately represents the system. 
• Running Under Variety of Input Parameters: We take a lot of simulation 
experiments by changing input parameters in Chapter 4. We see that the outputs 
are reasonable. Because outputs of the model are as expected. 
• Animation: We develop animation to observe the movements and states of 
entities in our model. We develop two kinds of animation; one is with using all 
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entities for border platoon and the other one is with using states of zones for 
border company. 
 
3.4.2.   Validation of Model 
           By validating our model we can see that the proposed model for border security 
system is really the accurate representation of the real system. Only after the model is 
validated the evaluations made with the model can be credible and correct. We use some 
techniques to validate our model. In addition, when we examine the results of 
experiments presented in next chapters, we see that our model gives reasonable results 
that show the model is valid.  
• Fault/Failure insertion test:  This test is used to observe the output of the model 
when a fault (incorrect model component) or a failure (incorrect behavior of a 
model component) is inserted into the model. If the model produces the invalid 
behavior as expected we can say that our model is valid. First, we insert a new 
security element that behaves like thermal camera into the system (incorrect 
model component). But interarrival time of beginning to duty of this new security 
element is shorter than typical interarrival time of thermal camera. Then, we 
observe the results as seen in Figure 3.8. The degree of controllability is estimated 
80% instead of expected 25%. The model produces the invalid behavior as 
expected. Secondly, we change the behavior of thermal camera and askarad as 
they go only one place and control the areas that can be controlled from that place 
(incorrect behavior of a model component). Then, we observe the results as seen 
in Figure 3.9. The degree of controllability differs about 30% between zones that 
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askarad and thermal camera go and not go. We conclude that the model produces 
the invalid behavior as expected; that is we can say that our model is valid. 
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 Figure 3.8. Fault Insertion Test                     Figure 3.9. Failure Insertion Test 
 
 
• Comparison of Simulation results and calculations made by hand: We 
calculate degree of controllability of one zone from each of the border platoons 
by using input data. Then we compare these results with ones we obtain from the 
simulation model. Figure 3.10 shows the comparison. The results we obtain from 
simulation model are smaller than calculations made by hand for all zones due to 
overlaps. In the real system, the zones can be controlled by different security 
elements at the same time and when the simulation model meets such a situation 
it takes into account only one of the security elements but when we calculate by 
hand we cannot consider such a situation. As a result, it is reasonable that 
simulation results are a bit smaller and it is more valid than calculations made by 
hand since simulation model takes overlaps into account. 
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 Figure 3.10. Comparison of Simulation Model Results and  
                     Calculations made by hand 
 
 
 
• Sensitivity Analysis: This technique is performed by systematically changing the 
values of model input variables and parameters over some range of interest and 
observing the effect upon model behavior. Unexpected effects may reveal 
invalidity. We conduct a number of experiments by changing input variables; 
when we investigate the behavior of the system, find out the relations of system 
components and contribution of each security elements to the system in Chapter 
4. We present many graphics and constructed confidence intervals there. In these 
experiments we don’t meet any unexpected effect of input variables on outputs. 
Even, all the results are reasonable as expected. 
 
• Visualization and Animation: Since we have animation of the model, we can 
easily observe the behavior of the system. We can conclude that the system is 
modeled as in the real life. A sight of animation of the simulation model is given 
in Figure 3.11. 
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Figure 3.11. A Sight of Animation of the Simulation Model 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Experimentation and Output Data Analysis 
 
 
4.1.  Determination of Run-length and Number of Replications 
 
To obtain accurate results from the simulation model we have to determine 
appropriate sample sizes by adjusting simulation run-length and/or determining the 
number of replications. In general, half-length of a confidence interval constructed 
around the estimator is used as a measure of accuracy. To achieve the desired accuracy, 
we first run the simulation model with five replications for different run-lengths. Here we 
use degree-of-controllability as an output variable or performance measure. Then, we 
calculate point and interval estimators (i.e., mean and confidence interval). We note that 
half-length as an indicator of accuracy is different for different zones (some of them are 
narrow, some of them are wide). Since our aim is to achieve the desired accuracy in the 
worst-case situation, we decide to use the half- length of a zone, which is maximum out 
of all the zones for a given run-length. Figure 4.1 presents the results for various run-
lengths. As seen in this figure, for example, zone 78 has the maximum half-length for the 
simulation run-length of one-week whereas zone 37 has the maximum half-length (least 
accuracy) for 3-year simulation run-length. Note that the curve gets flat after 6-month of 
run-length, this means that variance of the estimator stabilizes after certain number of 
observations in the output data. We obtain the desired precision and confidence levels 
from the experts of the system. In Table 4.1, desired precisions are presented for each 
performance measure.        
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 Figure 4.1. Determination of run-length for degree of controllability 
Table 4.1. Desired precisions   
 
 
Then, we calculate number of replications required to obtain an absolute precision 
0.02 (approximately 10% relative precision) for different simulation run-lengths, starting 
from 6-month run-length for degree of controllability. To determine sample sizes, we use 
two-stage procedure suggested by Law and Kelton (1991). Table 4.2 presents the two-
stage procedure results. Based on these results, we conclude that 1-year run-length and 
10 replications is enough to achieve desired accuracy. One-year run-length is selected 
because 6-month run-length requires excessive simulation replications (e.g. 23 runs). On 
the other hand, 2 and 3-year run-lengths need approximately same number of replications 
          Performance  
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with 1-year run-length, but they need 2 and 3 times more of computer time. Hence, we 
decided to set the run-length to 1 year and the number of replications to 10 for the 
degree-of-controllability performance measure. 
When the same procedure is applied for other performance measures, we observe 
that 4 replications are enough for the ratio-of-illegal-infiltrations-caught measure and 2 
replications for the frequency-of-controlling to obtain desired accuracy. However, to be 
on the conservative side, we decided to take maximum of these replications for the rest of 
the study (i.e., 1 year run-length and 10 replications). 
Using the sample sizes determined above, we run the simulation model and 
calculate the point and interval estimators for each performance measure at various 
confidence levels, e.g., 90%, 95%, and 99%. The results are presented for border 
company and for each border platoon in Appendix A (Tables A.1a-A.1c, A.3a-A.5d). 
When the half-length of these confidence intervals are examined, it is observed that 
absolute and relative precision for each performance measure are satisfied (see p.95). 
Table 4.2. Results of Two-stage Procedure 
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# of replications according to 2nd stage 
calculations for β = 0.02 and α = 0.05 
6 months 20 23 
1 year 8 10 
2 years 5 8 
3 years 4 6 
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4.2.    Output Analysis of the System 
Having the simulation model developed, verified, validated and appropriate 
sample sizes determined, we analyze the system for each performance measure. 
Specifically, we examine the behavior of the system, find out the relationships between 
performance measures and security elements, and determine the weak and strong sides of 
the system. We also identify the relationships between performance measures and 
investigate effects of each security element on each performance measure. 
 
4.2.1.  Analysis of Degree of Controllability Performance Measure 
 Recall that degree of controllability (DOC) is the ratio of time that a zone is 
under control by security elements (patrol, ambush, thermal camera, askarad) in one year 
time period. The results of the simulation experiments for DOC are given in Figure 4.2. 
As seen in Figure 4.2a, some of the zones have higher degree of controllability and some 
of them have less. It means that our control is not uniform along the border. This is due 
to the different use of security elements in the different zones. This highly volatile 
behavior has the mean of 0.2199. The confidence intervals constructed for 90%, 95%, 
and 99% are given in Appendix A (Table A.2a and Tables A.6a-A.6d) for border 
company and for each border platoon. In our study the zones between 1-24, 25-42, 43-60, 
61-84 are in the responsibility terrain of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th platoons, respectively. 
To explain the behavior of DOC, we also run the simulation model when only 
one of the security elements is in the system. The distributions of DOC when only one of 
the security elements is present in the system are given in Figures 4.2b-4.2e. Ambush has 
the most variability for DOC, since they are used only in the critical zones, whereas 
patrols have the least variability due to the fact that they are used unifomly along the  
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Figure 4.2. Distribution of degree of controllability 
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borders. Note also that the behavior of thermal camera and askarad (in terms of 
variability) is somewhere in between ambush and patrols. Because, thermal camera and 
askarad, for example, once they are located on their duty places, they provide the security 
service for wider zones. The overall effects of all security elements are seen in Figure 
4.2a. Note that the DOC measure is mostly affected by the ambushes. 
Moreover, Figure 4.2 displays the weak and the strong sides of the security 
system along the border. Once the weak sides are identified commanders take necessary 
precautions to improve the level of security. For example, 57th zone seems to be the 
weakest zone in our system. This is due to the fact that only patrols give the security 
service to this zone. Thus, other security elements should be selected for this zone to 
improve DOC. 
 
4.2.2. Analysis of Frequency of Controlling Performance Measure 
Recall that frequency-of-controlling (FOC) shows how many different times any 
zone gets under control by security elements (patrol, ambush, thermal camera, askarad) 
in one year time period. The results of the simulation experiments for FOC are given in 
Figure 4.3. As seen in Figure 4.3a, distribution of FOC is not uniform along the border. 
This behavior is due to the different mobility characteristics of each security element. We 
also observe that the zones between 25 and 60 have less FOC with respect to other zones. 
This difference is due to the different capacity of patrol. 1st and 4th platoons have capacity 
of patrol for two sides whereas 2nd and 3rd platoons for one side. The FOC has the mean 
of 2025. The confidence intervals constructed for 90%, 95%, and 99% are given in 
Appendix A (Table A.2b and Tables A.7a-A.7d) for border company and for each border 
platoon.  
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To explain the behavior of FOC, we also run the simulation model when only one 
of the security elements is in the system. The distributions of FOC when only one of the 
security elements is present in the system are given in Figures 4.3b-4.3e. We notice that 
the shape of distribution of FOC in Figure 4.3a and the shape of distribution of FOC 
when only patrols are in the system in Figure 4.3b are very similar to each other. This 
shows us that the most mobile security element in the system is patrols. We also observe 
from Figure 4.3b that the zones in the responsibility terrain of 2nd and 3rd platoons have 
significantly less FOC due to the capacity of patrol to one side. Patrols have the least 
variability due to the fact that they are used uniformly along the borders whereas ambush 
has the most variability for FOC, since they are used only in the critical zones. Unlike for 
DOC, FOC is less for the zones where ambushes get under control. Because, if a zone is 
under control for a long time (a zone can be under control throughout the night by 
ambushes, thermal camera and askarad) then FOC doesn’t occur during this time period. 
It shows us that FOC is less for the zones that DOC is at high level. The overall effects of 
all security elements are seen in Figure 4.3a. Note that the FOC measure along the 
borderline is mostly affected by the patrols. 
Moreover, Figure 4.3 displays the weak and the strong sides of the security 
system along the borderlines. Once the weak sides are identified commanders take 
necessary precautions to improve the level of security. For example, the zones between 
24 and 60 seem to be the weak zones in our system. This is due to the fact that capacity 
of patrol to one side. Thus, precautions should be taken to increase the capacity of patrol 
or mobility of patrols between these zones to improve FOC. 
 
 
 45
4.2.3.  Analysis of Ratio of Illegal Infiltrations Caught Performance    
            Measure. 
Recall that ratio-of-illegal-infiltration-caught (ROIIC) is the ratio of number of 
caught illegal infiltrations to the total number of caught and couldn’t be caught 
infiltrations in one year time period. The results of the simulation experiments for ROIIC 
are given in Figure 4.4. As seen in Figure 4.4 distribution of ROIIC is not uniform along 
the border. The shape of distribution of ROIIC reminds us the shape of distribution of 
FOC due to weakness between zones 25 and 60. When we compare distributions of DOC 
and ROIIC, we notice that ROIIC is less where DOC is less and vice-versa. These 
observations bring mind a question whether there are relationships between DOC, FOC 
and ROIIC. We analyze these relationships in detail in Section 4.2.4. The ROIIC has the 
mean of 0.5307. The confidence intervals constructed for 90%, 95%, and 99% are given 
in Appendix A (Table A.2c and Tables A.8a-A.8d) for border company and for each 
border platoon.  
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of Ratio of Illegal Infiltrations Caught 
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  Figure 4.5 Distribution of Ratio of Illegal Infiltrations Caught                                                       
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The distributions of ROIIC for each type of illegal infiltration (refugee, terrorist, 
smuggler, enemy special force and enemy troops) are presented in Figures 4.5a-4.5e. As 
seen in these figures, for example, ROIIC is around 0.6 for refugee type of infiltrations 
whereas 0.2 for enemy special force type of infiltrations. Because, infiltration time varies 
for each type of infiltration. Terrorists or enemy special forces, infiltrate through the 
border quickly since they are trained and they move in the form of small groups whereas 
it takes time for refugees to infiltrate since they move in the form of large groups.  We 
present the number of infiltrations caught/couldn’t caught and probability of catching for 
each type of illegal infiltrations in Figures 4.5g-4.5h. As seen in these figures, the 
probabilities of catching enemy special force and terrorist type of infiltrations are low 
whereas the probability of catching refugee type of infiltrations is high. To increase the 
catching probability, we have to extend the infiltration time of illegal infiltrations. 
Therefore, precautions must be taken such as building physical obstacles at some parts of 
border to extend the infiltration time of illegal infiltrations. 
 
4.2.4. Analysis of Relationships Between Performance Measures 
           When we analyzed the ROIIC performance measure in Section 4.2.3, we stated 
that there might be some relationships between DOC, FOC and ROIIC. We now exploit 
these relationships between these performance measures. 
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4.2.4.1. Relationship Between Degree of Controllability and Ratio of  
 Illegal Infiltrations Caught  
First, we construct a graph that displays the results of each performance measure 
at each zone. As seen in Figure 4.5, there is a high correlation between these two 
measures. Specifically, ROIIC increases as DOC increases.  
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            Figure 4.6. Correlation Between Ratio of Illegal Infiltrations Caught and  
                   Degree of Controllability 
 
 We also take additional simulation experiments to investigate the relationships 
between DOC and ROIIC by changing the capacity of security elements (patrols, 
ambushes, thermal camera, askarad). As will be explained in Section 4.2.4.2, there are 
interactions between FOC and ROIIC, and patrols are the main factor affecting FOC. To 
identify the relationship between DOC and ROIIC accurately without mixing up with the 
one between FOC and ROIIC, we don’t increase the capacity of patrols, while changing 
the capacities of other security elements (ambushes, thermal camera, askarad). But, to 
observe the relationships at low levels of DOC, we decrease the capacity of patrols from 
the point that no security element except patrols exists in the system. The simulation 
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results after changes are given in Table 4.3 (all these changes are called policies in the 
table). As seen in Figure 4.7, there is a relationship between DOC and ROIIC (ROIIC 
increases as the DOC increases). Figure 4.8 displays the relationship between DOC, 
ROIIC and cost for various capacities of security elements. Notice that the capacity 
increase is achieved by the multiples of the base capacity.  
 
Table 4.3. Policies and results of performance measures 
 
 (*) The policies are based on the interarrival times. “Others” indicate ambushes, thermal 
camera and askarad. Capacity of security elements increase as the interarrival time 
decreases. Since the patrols are the main factor that affects the FOC, we don’t increase 
the capacity of patrols from the point of their typical interarrival time. Thus, we can 
observe the relationship between DOC and ROIIC more accurately without mixing up 
the one between FOC and ROIIC. 
 
 
 
 
Policy no Policies to obtain different amount of degree of controllability 
Degree of 
Controllability 
Ratio of 
Illegal 
Infiltrations 
Caught 
Increase in 
the capacity 
of security 
elements 
1 There is no security elements in the system 0 0 0 
2 Patrols 720. Others not in the system* 0.0303 0.132 0 
3 Patrols 360. Others not in the system* 0.0467 0.2504 0 
4 Patrols 180. Others not in the system* 0.069 0.4382 0 
5 Patrols 180. Others 3600* 0.1076 0.4578 0.2 
6 Patrols 180. Others 2880* 0.1181 0.4721 0.25 
7 Patrols 180. Others 1440* 0.1524 0.4888 0.5 
8 Patrols 180. Others 720* 0.2199 0.5307 1 
9 Patrols 180. Others 470* 0.272 0.5444 1.5 
10 Patrols 180. Others 360* 0.3133 0.5621 2 
11 Patrols 180. Others 270* 0.3598 0.5772 2.66 
12 Patrols 180. Others 240* 0.4028 0.5915 3 
13 Patrols 180. Others 180* 0.452 0.6019 4 
14 Patrols 180. Others 144* 0.485 0.6233 5 
15 Patrols 180. Others 120* 0.5155 0.6359 6 
16 Patrols 180. Others 102* 0.5503 0.6519 7 
17 Patrols 180. Others 90* 0.5788 0.6586 8 
18 Patrols 180. Others 80* 0.6049 0.6778 9 
19 Patrols 180. Others 72* 0.6228 0.6847 10 
20 Patrols 180. Others 50* 0.6898 0.7151 14 
21 Patrols 180. Others 40* 0.7282 0.7295 18 
22 Patrols 180. Others 30* 0.7712 0.7834 24 
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In general, increase in the capacity of security elements improves DOC. But the 
main purpose of increasing DOC is to increase ROIIC. However, Figure 4.8 displays that 
improvement in DOC and ROIIC are not symmetric that is they do not proportionally 
increase. Because some parts of border cannot be controlled with high-tech devices 
(askarad, thermal camera) due to terrain conditions. This means that by increasing 
quantity of high-tech devices, we do not necessarily prevent infiltrations along border. 
Thus, border security planners must avoid unconsciously increase in the quantity of high-
tech devices. Because, their additional costs can not be justified. Once the appropriate 
quantity of high-tech devices is identified, duty places of ambushes must be planned for 
parts of borderline that cannot be controlled with high-tech devices to maximize ROIIC.   
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
degree of controllability
ra
tio
 o
f i
lle
ga
l i
nf
ilt
ra
tio
ns
 c
au
gh
t
 
Figure 4.7. Relationship Between Degree of Controllability and Ratio of Illegal  
                  Infiltrations Caught  
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Figure 4.8.  Relation between DOC, ROIIC, cost and capacity of security elements 
 
 
4.2.4.2. Relationship Between Frequency of Controlling and Ratio of          
 Illegal Infiltrations Caught  
 
 When analyzed FOC in Section 4.2.2, we stated that the main factor that affects 
the frequency of controlling was patrols. Thus, we conduct simulation experiments to 
explain the relationship between FOC and ROIIC by changing the capacity of patrols 
while keeping the capacity of other security elements constant. The simulation results 
after changes are given in Table 4.4 (all these changes are called policies in the table). As 
seen in Figure 4.9, there is a relationship between FOC and ROIIC (ROIIC increases as 
FOC increases). Figure 4.10 displays the relationship between DOC and ROIIC for 
various capacities of patrols. Notice that the capacity increase is achieved by the 
multiples of the base capacity of patrols. 
In general, increase in the capacity of patrols improves FOC. But the main 
purpose of increasing FOC is to increase ROIIC. However, Figure 4.10 displays that 
improvement in FOC and ROIIC are not symmetric, that is they do not proportionally 
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increase. This is due to low probability of catching illegal infiltrations such as terrorist or 
enemy special force. Because, they infiltrate through the border quickly since they are 
trained and they move in the form of small groups. This means that, by increasing 
capacity of patrols, we do not necessarily prevent infiltrations along border. Thus, border 
security planners must identify the appropriate quantity of patrols, and then precautions 
such as building of physical obstacles or increasing the mobility of patrols must be taken. 
Both precautions increase ROIIC. Because, physical obstacles extend the infiltration time 
of infiltrations and increasing the mobility of patrols increase FOC (recall that ROIIC 
increases as FOC increases).  
 
 
Table 4.4. Policies and results of performance measures 
 (*)The policies are based on interarrival times. “Others” indicate ambushes, thermal 
camera and askarad. Capacity of patrols increases as the interarrival time decreases. 
Since main factor that affects the frequency of controlling is patrols, we change the 
capacity of patrols while keeping the capacity of other security elements constant. 
 
Policy no Policy Frequency of Controlling 
Ratio of Illegal 
Infiltrations 
Caught 
Increase in the 
capacity of 
patrols 
1 There is no security elements in the system 0 0 0 
2 Patrols not in the system. Others 720* 179 0.2141 0 
3 Patrols 720.Others 720* 651 0.3011 0.25 
4 Patrols 360.Others 720* 1123 0.3851 0.5 
5 Patrols 180.Others 720* 2052 0.5307 1 
6 Patrols 135.Others 720* 2627 0.6049 1.33 
7 Patrols 90.Others 720* 3651 0.7075 2 
8 Patrols 60.Others 720* 5015 0.7948 3 
9 Patrols 45.Others 720* 6173 0.8495 4 
10 Patrols 30.Others 720* 8018 0.9075 5 
11 Patrols 20.Others 720* 10080 0.95 9 
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 Figure 4.9. Relationship Between Frequency of Controlling and Ratio of Illegal  
                   Infiltrations Caught 
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 Figure 4.10. Relationship Between Performance Measures and Capacity of Patrols 
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4.3.  Analysis of Effect of Each Security Element  
       One of the main research issues considered in our study is to evaluate the security 
elements, which constitute the border security system, according to their effects on the 
performance measures. It’s important for any commander to know his troops capabilities. 
Commanders of border troops usually want to see the capabilities of security elements 
for protection of borders so that they can determine priorities for maintenance and 
training activities accordingly. We run a factorial design to assess the effect of each 
security element on each performance measure. 
 
4.3.1. 24 Factorial Design 
         We consider each security element as a factor. Specifically, we have 4 factors 
(patrols, ambushes, thermal camera and askarad). As seen in Table 4.5, we set the high 
and low values of each factor according to whether the security element typically exists 
in the system or not. 
Table 4.5.Factors Effecting Border Security System 
               
 We conduct our simulation experiments at 16 design points with 10 simulation 
replications. Results are presented in Appendix B (Tables B.1-B.3). 
FACTOR 
FACTOR 
DESCRIPTION 
-1 +1 
A PATROLS NO PATROL IN THE SYSTEM 
PATROLS ARE TYPICALLY IN 
THE SYSTEM 
B AMBUSHES NO AMBUSH IN THE SYSTEM 
AMBUSHES ARE TYPICALLY 
IN THE SYSTEM 
C THERMAL CAMERA 
NO THERMAL CAMERA IN 
SYSTEM 
THERMAL CAMERA IS 
TYPICALLY IN THE SYSTEM 
D ASKARAD NO ASKARAD IN THE SYSTEM 
ASKARAD IS TYPICALLY IN 
THE SYSTEM 
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To have a sound statistical analysis, we have to check the homogeneity of 
variances and normality assumptions. Thus, we first applied Bartlett test (Montgomery 
1992) and Levene test (Levene 1960). As presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7, 
homogeneity of variances is rejected for each performance measure.  
 Table 4.6. Levene Test Results 
(*)A low significance value (generally less than 0.05) indicates that the variance differs 
significantly between groups. 
 
 Table 4.7 Bartlett Test Results 
 (*) we reject 0H , only when 
2 2
0 , 1aαχ χ −>                       
  
 When we examine the results in detail (Appendix B, Tables B.1-B.3), we observe that 
variance of one of the design points (when there is no security element in the system) for 
each performance measure is zero. Since variance stabilization techniques cannot help 
due to zero variance data points, we use the results of factorial design as suggestive 
rather than conclusive. These diagrams for each performance measure are presented in 
Figure 4.11. 
 
Performance 
measures F df1 df2 
Significance 
value* Test result 
Ratio of Illegal 
Infiltrations 
Caught 
2.720 15 144 .001 reject 
Degree of 
Controllability 6.073 15 144 .000 reject 
Frequency of 
Controlling 5.483 15 144 .000 reject 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES  
Ratio of illegal infiltrations caught Degree of controllability Frequency of controlling 
2
pS  4.17E-05 1.13E-05 93.85977 
q  43.8978852 71.08673 79.01167 
c  1.04 1.04 1.04 
2
0χ  97.1916061 157.3888 174.9349 
2
, 1aαχ −  25 25 25 
test result Reject* Reject* Reject* 
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By considering these results, we conclude that the most effective factor for 
ROIIC is patrols (see Figure 4.11a). Other security elements also improve ROIIC, but not 
as much as patrols. In terms of DOC each security element improves DOC (Figure 
4.11b). As seen in Figure 4.11c, patrols have positive effect for FOC whereas the others 
(ambush, thermal camera and askarad) have negative effects. Because, these security 
elements improve DOC. As discussed in detail in Section 4.2.2, FOC is less for the zones 
that DOC is at high level. 
 
4.3.2. Paired-T Approach 
          We also apply the paired-T comparison to see if each security element has 
statistically impact on the performance measures or not.  We use the data given in 
Appendix B (Tables B.1-B.3). The paired-T results are presented in Tables 4.8-4.10 for 
each performance measure. In these tables, “A” refers to the results of design point that 
all factors (security elements) are with their low value (security elements are not in the 
system). “All” refers to the results of design point that all factors are with their high 
value (all security elements are in the system). “PAT, AMB, TER, ASK” represents 
patrols, ambushes, thermal camera and askarad. “Pat-A” is the comparison of when only 
patrols are in the system and no security element in the system. “All-Pat” is the 
comparison of security elements are in the system and all security elements except 
patrols are in the system. All these results indicate that, with their existence in the 
system, each security element has significant effect on each performance measure.  
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a) Main Effect Diagram (Ratio of illegal infiltrations Caught)       
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Figure 4.11 Main effect diagrams of each performance measure 
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Table 4.8.  Paired Samples Test   for Ratio of Illegal Infiltrations Caught Performance Measure   
                        
 
Table 4.9.  Paired Samples Test for Degree of Controllability Performance Measure 
Paired Differences 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
t 
 
df 
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 Lower Upper    
Pair 1 PAT - A 6.901E-02 1.525E-04 4.82E-05 6.890E-02 6.91E-02 1430.907 9 .000 
Pair 2 AMB - A 8.291E-02 1.246E-03 3.94E-04 8.202E-02 8.3808E-02 210.392 9 .000 
Pair 3 TER - A 5.625E-02 3.162E-03 1.00E-03 5.399E-02 5.852E-02 56.255 9 .000 
Pair 4 ASK - A 4.414E-02 4.438E-03 1.40E-03 4.097E-02 4.732E-02 31.453 9 .000 
Pair 5 ALL - PAT 5.339E-02 6.837E-03 2.162E-03 4.85E-02 5.828E-02 24.694 9 .000 
Pair 6 ALL - AMB 6.284E-02 6.226E-03 1.969E-03 5.83E-02 6.729E-02 31.914 9 .000 
Pair 7 ALL - TER 3.98E-02 5.209E-03 1.64E-03 3.607E-02 4.352E-02 24.157 9 .000 
Pair 8 ALL - ASK 3.137E-02 4.07E-03 1.28E-03 2.84E-02 3.428E-02 24.329 9 .000 
 
 
Table 4.10.  Paired Samples Test for Frequency of Controlling Performance Measure 
Paired Differences 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
t 
 
df 
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 Lower Upper    
Pair 1 PAT - A 2412.44 12.847 4.062 2403.25 2421.636 593.797 9 .000 
Pair 2 AMB - A 65.0 1.4380 .4547 63.977 66.034 142.950 9 .000 
Pair 3 TER - A 37.45 1.906 .6029 36.0920 38.8198 62.126 9 .000 
Pair 4 ASK - A 33.02 4.1859 1.3237 30.028 36.0158 24.946 9 .000 
Pair 5 ALL - PAT 1923.07 21.888 6.9218 1907.418 1938.7357 277.826 9 .000 
Pair 6 ALL - AMB -167.411 21.166 6.693 -182.553 -152.270 -25.012 9 .000 
Pair 7 ALL - TER1 -115.70 24.521 7.754 -133.241 -98.158 -14.921 9 .000 
Pair 8 ALL - ASK1 -71.978 18.756 5.931 -85.396 -58.560 -12.135 9 .000 
 
 
 
Paired Differences 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference  Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean Lower Upper 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Pair 1 PAT - A .43813 7.018E-03 2.219E-03 .4331 .4431 197.394 9 .000 
Pair 2 AMB - A .13812 3.70E-03 1.172E-03 .1354 .1407 117.774 9 .000 
Pair 3 TER - A 7.395E-02 5.330E-03 1.685E-03 7.0139E-02 7.776E-02 43.871 9 .000 
Pair 4 ASK - A 6.019E-02 7.09E-03 2.245E-03 5.511E-02 6.527E-02 26.812 9 .000 
Pair 5 ALL - PAT .3180 1.013E-02 3.203E-03 .3108 .3253 99.282 9 .000 
Pair 6 ALL - AMB 4.11E-02 6.73E-03 2.12E-03 3.635E-02 4.59E-02 19.333 9 .000 
Pair 7 ALL - TER 1.79E-02 1.062E-02 3.361E-03 1.033E-02 2.55E-02 5.337 9 .000 
Pair 8 ALL - ASK 1.22E-02 8.967E-03 2.835E-03 5.86E-03 1.869E-02 4.332 9 .002 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Design and Analysis of Experiments  
In the previous chapter, we analyzed the system behavior by examining the 
relationships between the security elements and the performance measures and 
relationships between the performance measures. We also investigated effects of each 
security element on each performance measure. Since the security elements have 
significant affects, we further examine them for various policies in this chapter. 
The degree of use of security elements, stationary or mobile use of security 
elements, time period that patrols spend on border control and type of patrols (motorized 
or on-foot) are such policies about how security elements are used for protection of 
borders. In this chapter, we study for how and how much do such policies affect the 
system performances and find out the possible ways of improving performance measures.  
 
5.1.  25 Factorial Design 
 In Chapter 4.3.1, we have performed 24 factorial design to assess the effect of 
each security element (patrols, ambushes, thermal camera and askarad) on the 
performance measures. In this chapter, we investigate the effects of different policies on 
each performance measure. The policies are (1) the degree of use of high-tech devices, 
(2) the degree of use of night-vision tools, (3) stationary or mobile characteristics of duty, 
(4) the degree of use of motorized patrols, (5) duty time of patrols. We consider these 
policies as factors that affect the system performances, such as ratio-of-illegal-
infiltrations-caught, degree-of-controllability, frequency-of-controlling.  
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We determine these factors and their levels according to Border Services 
Instruction (KKY 118-1) and by consulting military experts. All factors are controllable. 
It is recommended in Border Services Instruction not to use high-tech devices frequently. 
Because, it is desired to extend the lifetime of these devices. Moreover, failure of these 
devices is an undesired situation for commanders. Thus, they may prefer to use these 
devices seldom. On the other hand, operational activities for protection of borders need 
these devices. Above statements are valid for night-vision tools and motorized patrols. 
Therefore, we set low and high values of factors a, b and d according to how frequent 
these devices are used. The levels of factors indicate the probability of use of the high-
tech devices or night-vision tools for duty of that day. The commander determines 
stationary or mobile characteristics of duty. This varies according to number of critical 
zones or terrain conditions. The levels of the factor indicate what percent the duty will be 
mobile. The maximum time that patrols spent on border control is determined as 4 hours 
in Border Services Instruction. But most of the troops apply 3-hour policy. The factors 
and their levels are presented in Table 5.1.   
Table 5.1. Factors and levels of 25 factorial design 
 
 
FACTOR FACTOR DESCRIPTION -1 +1 
A The degree of use of high-tech devices 40% 95% 
B The degree of use of night-vision tools  25% 75% 
C 
Determination of stationary 
or mobile characteristics of 
duty 
30% 70% 
D The degree of use of motorized patrols 15% 70% 
E Duty time of patrols 3 hours 4hours 
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We implement 25 factorial design study, which consists of 32 design points. We 
investigate the main and interaction effects of factors on each system response. We take 
10 simulation runs of each design point, so that the randomization is satisfied to make 
factorial design. Results of 25 factorial design for each performance measure are 
presented in Appendix C (Table C.3-C.5). To find out the significant factors and their 
interactions, we implement analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
 
 
5.2.   Implementation of ANOVA 
To implement analysis of variance, two main ANOVA assumptions 
(homogeneity of variances and normality) must be satisfied. Because any violation of 
ANOVA assumptions may cause serious problems in the final analysis. 
 
         Homogeneity of Variances 
We test the following hypothesis:  
2 2 2
0 1 2: ......... aH σ σ σ= = =  
1H : above not true for at least one 
2
iσ  
We apply Bartlett’s (Montgomery 1992) and Levene’s (Levene 1960) tests. The 
results are presented in Tables 5.2-5.3. 
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Table 5.2. Bartlett test results for 25 factorial design 
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we reject 0H , only when  
2 2
0 , 1aαχ χ −>                       
                                                                                 
 
Table 5.3. Levene test results for 25 factorial design 
(*)The Levene statistic tests the hypothesis of equality of variance of the dependent 
variable for groups. A low significance value (generally less than 0.05) indicates that the 
variance differs significantly between groups. 
 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES  
Ratio of illegal infiltrations 
caught 
Degree of 
controllability 
Frequency of 
controlling 
2
pS  2.05E-06 2.78E-07 7.463576 
q  -364.848 -496.514 -462.141 
c  1.02 1.02 1.02 
2
0χ  -823.626 -1120.86 -1043.26 
2
, 1aαχ −  45 45 45 
test result Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject 
Performance 
measures F df1 df2 
Significance 
value* Test results 
Ratio of illegal 
infiltrations 
caught 
.932 31 288 .575 Do not reject 
Degree of 
controllability .794 31 288 .776 
Do not 
reject 
Frequency of 
controlling 1.648 31 288 .020 reject 
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Bartlett test results in Table 5.2 indicate that homogeneity of variances is satisfied 
for each performance measure. But, Levene test results in Table 5.3 indicate that 
homogeneity of variances is not satisfied for FOC. To be on the safe side, we decided to 
take the suggestion of Levene test (i.e., we accept the results of Levene test). We further 
analyze the results of 25 factorial design for FOC presented in Appendix C (Table C.5). 
These results indicate that frequency-of-controlling is highly affected by factor d (degree 
of use of motorized patrols). We compare the results of design points when factor d is 
with its high value and the results of design points when factor d is with its low value by 
using t test. The test result is presented in Table 5.4. 
 
 
 
 Table 5.4. t-test for FOC  
 
As seen in Table 5.4, there is statistically significant difference between two groups of 
results. This means that the motorized patrols make big differences in the data set. This 
in turn breaks the common variance assumption. Thus we decided to implement two 24 
factorial designs instead of 25 for the FOC measure by isolating this factor. When we 
apply Bartlett and Levene for 4 factors, we see that homogeneity of variances is satisfied 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
99% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
 
t 
 
df 
 
Sig. (2-
tailed)
 
Mean 
Difference
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
 
Lower Upper 
3.852 .059 17.22 30 .000 733.803 42.5915 616.676 850.929X 
Equal variances 
assumed 
 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  17.22 25.86 .000 733.803 42.5915 615.40 852.201
 64
(see the results in Table 5.5-5.6). Scatter plots given in Appendix D (Figure D.1a-D.1d) 
also confirm the common variance assumption.  
 
Table 5.5. Bartlett Test Results For 24 Factorial Design 
 
Table 5.6. Levene Test Results For 24  Factorial Design 
 
 
Normality Assumptions 
A check of the normality assumption can be made by plotting a histogram of 
residuals. The residuals for the ith treatment are found by subtracting the treatment 
average from each observation in that treatment. Residuals are presented in Appendix D 
(Table D.1). If the normality assumption is satisfied, histogram of residuals should look 
like a sample from a normal distribution centered at zero. The histogram compared with 
normal is presented in Figure 5.1 for the ROIIC performance measure. In Appendix D 
(Figure D.2a-D.2c) histograms are presented for other two measures (FOC and DOC). As 
seen in these figures, histogram of residuals look like a sample from a normal 
 F df1 df2 Significance value 
Motorized patrol with high level .858 15 144 .611 
Motorized patrol with low level 1.228 15 144 .257 
Frequency of Controlling  
Motorized patrol with high level Motorized patrol with low level 
2
pS  488.3762 227.5717 
q  3.95793 9.098046 
c  1.04 1.04 
2
0χ  8.763009 20.14342 
2
, 1aαχ −  25 25 
test result Do not reject Do not reject 
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distribution centered at zero. It shows us the normality assumption for each performance 
measure is satisfied. 
            
 
                
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 N = 31.00 
             Figure 5.1. Histogram of residuals compared with normal for ratio of illegal          
                   infiltrations caught 
  
Another useful procedure is to construct a normal probability plot of residuals. If 
the distribution is normal, this plot will resemble a straight line. The normal probability 
plot of residuals for ROIIC is presented in Figure 5.2. In Appendix D (Figures D.3a-
D.3c), normal probability plots are presented for FOC and DOC. As seen in these figures, 
plots of residuals resemble a straight line. It shows that the normality assumption is 
satisfied for each performance measure. Scatter plot of residuals are also presented in 
Appendix D (Figures D.4a-D.4d). As seen in these figures, residuals are structureless that 
is; normality assumption is satisfied for each performance measure. 
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Observed Cum Prob
1.00.75 .50.250.00
Expected Cum 
Prob
1.00 
.75 
.50 
.25 
0.00 
       Figure 5.2.  Normal P-P of residuals for ratio of illegal  infiltrations caught 
 
After satisfying analysis of variance assumptions, we calculate the main and 
interaction effects of the factors for each performance measure. The ANOVA test is 
implemented by using SPSS statistical package program and the results are presented in 
Appendix C (Table C.6-C.10) for each performance measure. Normal probability plot of 
main and interaction effects are presented in Appendix C (Table C.11 and Figures C.1a-
C.1d) to validate the ANOVA results (as seen in these figures, all of the insignificant 
effects of ANOVA results lie along the zero line, whereas the significant effects are far 
from line). 
 
5.3. Interpretation of ANOVA Results of the Performance Measures 
In this section, we interpret main and interaction effects of factors for each 
performance measure by analyzing the ANOVA results. Recall that our performance 
measures are ratio-of-illegal-infiltrations-caught (ROIIC), degree-of-controllability 
(DOC) and frequency-of-controlling (FOC). 
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5.3.1. Interpretation of Main Effects and Interactions of Ratio of Illegal          
Infiltrations Caught Performance Measure.      
 The SPSS output of ROIIC statistics is given in Appendix D (Table C.6). It is 
clear that each factor is significant. We present the main effect diagram of factors for 
ROIIC in Figure 5.3. As seen in this figure, factor d (degree of use of motorized patrols) 
has the greatest effect on ROIIC. This is due to increase in the mobility of patrols. When 
the motorized type of patrols increase, frequency of controlling the zones increases. 
Recall from Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.4.2) that the ROIIC improves as FOC increases. FOC 
increases 38% when degree of use of motorized patrols is at its high level as seen in 
Figure 5.7. This improvement in FOC increases ROIIC 13% (Figure 5.3). When factor a 
(degree of use of high-tech devices) is at high level, DOC increases 28% (Figure 5.5). 
Recall from Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.4.1) that ROIIC increases as DOC increases but not 
proportionally. The improvement in DOC increases ROIIC 5% (Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3. Main effect diagram of factors for ratio of illegal infiltrations  
                  caught 
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 The graphs in Figure 5.4 are very useful in interpreting significant interactions. 
However, they should not be utilized as the sole technique of data analysis because their 
interpretation is subjective and their appearance is often misleading (Montgomery 1992). 
Therefore, in addition to these graphs, we construct Tables 5.7-5.9 for each performance 
measure. 
There are four significant interactions on ROIIC. These are between factors a-d, 
b-d, e-d and a-b-d-e. Notice that interactions are between factors (a, b and e) that have 
positive effect on DOC and factor (d) that has positive effect on FOC (explanation is 
given in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. The interactions between factors are presented in 
Figure 5.4a-5.4d. In these figures, the two lines are parallel to each other that indicate a 
lack of interaction. Thus, we explain interactions by using results in Table 5.7. There is 
an interaction between factors a and d since the effect of factor d on ROIIC depends on 
the level chosen for factor a. When the degree of use of high-tech devices is high, longer 
time the zones will be under control and this will decrease the control of zones by patrols 
(as explained in Chapter 4.2.2). When the degree of use of high-tech devices is low, less 
time the zones will be under control and this will increase the control of zones by patrols. 
Thus, effect of factor d on ROIIC will be less when factor a is with its high value and 
effect of factor d on ROIIC will be more when factor a is with its low value. Interactions 
b-d and e-d can be explained by same reasoning since factors b and e are like factor a 
(factors that increase DOC) and the second factor in the interactions is factor d same as in 
interaction a-d. The last interaction, abde, consists of factors that are in the two-
interactions. As seen in Table 5.7 (four interaction), when the three factors (a, b, e) are 
with their high levels, the effect of factor d on ROIIC is less and when the three factors 
(a, b, e) are with their low levels, the effect of factor d on ROIIC is more. 
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Table 5.7. Interactions between factors for ROIIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interactions Ratio of Illegal Infiltrations Caught 
D 
 
high low difference 
high 0.6185 0.5537 0.0648 
low 0.5967 0.5261 0.0706 
AD 
A 
difference 0.0218 0.0276  
D 
 
high low difference 
high 0.6137 0.5487 0.065 
low 0.6016 0.0705 0.0705 
BD 
B 
difference 0.0121 0.0176  
D 
 
high low difference 
high 0.6081 0.5427 0.0654 
low 0.6068 0.5371 0.0697 
ED 
E 
difference 0.0013 0.0056  
D 
 
high low difference 
high 0.6260 0.5876 0.0384 
low 0.5634 0.5149 0.048 
ABDE 
ABE 
difference 0.0625 0.0726  
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Figure 5.4. Interactions between factors        
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5.3.2. Interpretation of Main Effects and Interactions of Degree of         
          Controllability Performance Measure 
The SPSS output of DOC statistics is given in Appendix D (Table C.7). The 
results indicate that each factor is significant. As seen in Figure 5.5, factor a (degree of 
use of high-tech devices) has the greatest effect on DOC. This is due to usage of high- 
tech devices more frequently. When degree of use of high-tech devices is high, longer 
time the zones are under control. Then, DOC increases 28% when degree of use of high-
tech devices is at high level as seen in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5. Main effect diagram of factors for degree of controllability 
 
There are two significant interactions on DOC. These are between factors a-b and 
a-e. Notice that interactions are between factors that have all positive effect on DOC. The 
interactions between factors are presented in Figure 5.6a-5.6b and Table 5.8. There is an 
interaction between a and b since the effect of factor b on DOC depends on the level 
chosen for factor a. When the degree of use of high-tech devices is high, longer time the 
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zones will be under control and this will increase the probability of taking the same zones 
under control by ambushes and patrols. Thus, effect of factor b on DOC will be less 
when factor a is with its high value and effect of factor b on DOC will be more when 
factor a is with its low value.  Interaction a-e can be explained by same reasoning since 
factor e is like factor b (factors that increase DOC) and the second factor in the 
interaction is factor a same as in interaction  a-b.   
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a) Interaction between factor a and b                  b) Interaction between factor a and e 
                                                                    
Figure 5.6. Interactions between factors 
 
Table 5.8. Interactions between factors for degree of controllability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Degree Of Controllability 
B 
 
high low difference 
high 0.2829 0.2625 0.0204 
low 0.2244 0.2005 0.0239 
AB 
A 
difference 0.0585 0.062  
E 
 
high low difference 
high 0.2788 0.2199 0.0589 
low 0.2666 0.2050 0.0616 
AE 
A 
difference 0.0122 0.0149  
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5.3.3. Interpretation of Main Effects and Interactions of Frequency of  
          Controlling Performance Measure 
 The SPSS output of FOC statistics is given in Appendix D (Table C.8-C10). The 
results indicate that each factor is significant. As seen in Figure 5.3, factor d (degree of 
use of motorized patrols) has the greatest effect on FOC. This is due to increase in the 
mobility of patrols. When the degree of use of motorized patrols is high, frequency of 
controlling the zones increases. FOC increases 38% when degree of use of motorized 
patrols is at high level as seen in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.7. Main effect diagram of factors for frequency of controlling 
We divided 25 factorial design into two 24 factorial designs as we discussed in the 
homogeneity of variances section (Section 5.2). As seen in Figures 5.7a-5.7b both 24 
factorial design main effect graphs are similar. Factor c (stationary or mobile 
characteristics of duty) has the greatest effect on FOC. This is due to increase in the 
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a) Main effect diagram of factors for frequency of controlling 
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b) Main effect diagram of factors for frequency of controlling  
     (factor d is with its high value) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Main effect diagram of factors for frequency of controlling 
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mobile duties. When mobile duties increase, frequency of controlling the zones increases. 
FOC increases 4% when factor c is with its high level. Factors a, b and e have negative 
effect on FOC. This is due to increase in the DOC. These factors improve DOC, since 
longer time the zones will be under control when they are with their high levels. Recall 
from Chapter 4.2.2 that FOC is less for the zones that DOC is at high level.   
 There are four significant interactions on FOC. These are between factors a-c, a-
b, b-c and  b-e. The interactions between factors are presented in Figure 5.9a-5.9d and 
Table 5.9. Interactions between factors a-b and b-e are between factors that have positive 
effect on DOC. These interactions can be interpreted as the ones in Section 5.3.2. 
Interactions between factors a-c and b-c are between factors (a, b) that have positive 
effect on DOC and factor (c) that has positive effect on FOC. These interactions can be 
interpreted as the ones in Section 5.3.1.  
 
Table 5.9. Interactions between factors for frequency of controlling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interactions Frequency of controlling 
B 
 
high low difference 
high 2515 2582 -67 
low 2738 2824 -86 
AB 
A 
difference -223 -242  
B 
 
high low difference 
high 2671 2732 -61 
low 2581 2673 -92 
BC 
C 
difference 90 59  
B 
 
high low difference 
high 2571 2657 -86 
low 2681 2748 -67 
BE 
E 
difference -110 -91  
A 
 
high low difference 
high 1905 2034 -129 
low 1816 1967 -151 
AC 
C 
difference 89 67  
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Figure 5.8 Interactions between factors       
 
 
 
All these results are summarized in Table 5.10. Specifically, the magnitude and 
the direction of the factor effects on each performance are given in this table. Note that 
the effects of the factors are measured when we change the level of the factors from its 
low level to high level. 
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Table 5.10. Results of the factors affecting the performance measures 
Performance measures Significant factors Improvement 
The degree of use of high-
tech devices 28% 
The degree of use of night-
vision tools  10% 
Determination of stationary 
or mobile characteristics of 
duty 
-1% 
The degree of use of 
motorized patrols 1% 
Degree of controllability 
Duty time of patrols 6% 
The degree of use of high-
tech devices -8% 
The degree of use of night-
vision tools  -3% 
Determination of stationary 
or mobile characteristics of 
duty 
4% 
The degree of use of 
motorized patrols 38% 
Frequency of controlling 
Duty time of patrols -4% 
The degree of use of high-
tech devices 5% 
The degree of use of night-
vision tools  3% 
Determination of stationary 
or mobile characteristics of 
duty 
1% 
The degree of use of 
motorized patrols 13% 
Ratio of illegal infiltrations 
caught 
Duty time of patrols 1% 
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In concluding this chapter, we observe that factor d (degree of use of motorized 
patrols) has the greatest effect on ROIIC. FOC increases 38% when degree of use of 
motorized patrols is at its high level. This improvement in FOC increases ROIIC 13%. 
The factor a (degree of use of high-tech devices) follows factor d in the significance. 
When factor a is at high level, DOC increases 28%. This improvement in DOC increases 
ROIIC 5%. The factor b (The degree of use of night-vision tools) increases DOC 10% 
and ROIIC 3%. When factor e (duty time of patrols) is at high level DOC increases 6% 
but improvement in ROIIC is only 1%. Other factors (degree of use of motorized patrols 
and determination of stationary or mobile characteristics of duty) have little effect on 
DOC.  The factors a,b and e have negative effects on FOC. 
There are mainly two kinds of interaction. These are: (1) interaction between 
factors that have positive effect on DOC (factors a,b,e) and factors that have positive 
effect on FOC (c,d) such as a-c, b-d, a-d. When a,b,e is high, longer time the zones will 
be under control and this prevents the occurrence of control of zones different times. (2) 
interaction between factors that have positive effect on DOC such as a-b, b-e. When one 
of these factors is high, longer time the zones will be under control and this will increase 
the probability of taking the same zones under control by security elements.  
Commanders have to know that, when they increase the levels of more than one 
factor, the effect on performance measure will be less than total effect of each factor. For 
example, factor a improves ROIIC 5% and factor d improves 13%. When both factor are 
at high level, ROIIC increases 16% (note that it is 18% when we add effects of each 
factor). 
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CHAPTER  6 
 
Alternatives and Border Security System Model in the Support of  
Decision-making Process 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we have analyzed the system behavior, investigated effect of 
each security element on the performance measures and identified the significant factors. 
In this chapter, we develop different alternatives. These alternatives are the possible 
improvement methods. We know that improvement border security will cause financial 
costs. We evaluate these alternatives, compare and rank them by using ranking/ selection 
and multi-criteria decision-making procedures. The criteria are again our performance 
measures degree-of-controllability (DOC), frequency-of-controlling (FOC), ratio-of-
illegal-infiltrations-caught (ROIIC) and cost. 
Specifically, we will attempt to answer the following research questions: 
• If coordination is established between security elements, how much does 
it affect the performance measures? 
• How much do additional high-tech devices affect the performance 
measures? 
• Which improvement method is the best considering different criteria? 
• What is the effect of high mobility of patrols on the system 
performances?  
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6.1. Alternatives 
1. Benchmark system: It is the existing system and this is included in comparisons 
to observe the effect of coordinated system. 
2. The border security system that all patrols are motorized: When we analyzed 
the system in the previous chapters, we observed that the ROIIC increases as FOC 
increases. We also observed that FOC increases as motorized type of patrols increases.  
By including this improvement method, we will observe the effect of high mobility of 
patrols on the system performances. 
3. The system one more askarad and one more thermal camera added: These 
high-tech devices make it possible to control wider borderline. We know that ROIIC 
increases as DOC increases. We include this improvement method to observe the effect 
of additional high-tech devices. 
4. The system with coordinated security elements:  In the system, sometimes 
overlaps occur since the security elements take control the same zones. We prevent these 
overlaps by making it possible to have better coordination between security elements. As 
a result, we expect the DOC performance measure increases.  
5. The system with coordination established and all patrols are motorized:  This 
is the combination of the second and forth alternatives.  
6. The system with coordination and one more askarad and thermal camera 
added: Specifically, by including this alternative, we try to observe the effect of 
coordination when high-tech devices are increased. We expect that the degree-of-
controllability increase. 
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6.2. Evaluation of Alternatives by Using Ranking and Selection   
        Procedures. 
6.2.1. All Pairwise Comparisons 
We first run the simulation model for each alternative design and obtain the 
results. The results for each alternative design are presented in Appendix E (Tables E.1-
E.3) for each performance measure. Then, we make all pairwise comparisons to evaluate 
the alternatives. The results of all pairwise comparisons for the ROIIC performance 
measure are presented in Table 6.1. The results of all pairwise comparisons for DOC and 
FOC are presented in Appendix E (Tables E.4-E.5). We have 6 alternatives and 15 
comparisons. We make each comparison with 99% degree of confidence interval. In 
Figure 6.1, the pairwise comparisons of alternatives and ranking of alternatives for 
ROIIC is presented. In this figure, arrows between alternatives display the comparison of 
two alternatives. If the alternative is at the beginning point of arrow, this alternative is 
better than the one that is at the end point of arrow. We draw these graphs for all 
performance measures and rank the alternatives according to their position either at the 
beginning or end point of the arrow. In Figures 6.2 and 6.3, the graph of comparisons and 
ranking of alternatives for DOC and FOC are presented. 
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Table 6.1. Paired Samples Test of alternatives for ratio of illegal infiltrations caught  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paired Differences 
 
 
 
 
99% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
t 
 
df 
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 
Lower Upper    
Pair 1 ALT1 - ALT2 -.101083 1.57E-02 4.96E-03 -.117219 -8.49E-02 -20.359 9 .000 
Pair 2 ALT1 - ALT3 -3.00E-02 1.09E-02 3.47E-03 -4.13E-02 -1.87E-02 -8.651 9 .000 
Pair 3 ALT1 - ALT4 -5.97E-03 1.06E-02 3.37E-03 -1.69E-02 4.99E-03 -1.771 9 .110 
Pair 4 ALT1 - ALT5 -.104150 1.04E-02 3.31E-03 -.114933 -9.33E-02 -31.388 9 .000 
Pair 5 ALT1 - ALT6 -4.08E-02 1.07E-02 3.39E-03 -5.18E-02 -2.98E-02 -12.049 9 .000 
Pair 6 ALT2 - ALT3 7.10E-02 1.33E-02 4.22E-03 5.73E-02 8.47E-02 16.803 9 .000 
Pair 7 ALT2 - ALT4 9.51E-02 1.23E-02 3.90E-03 8.24E-02 .1077962 24.363 9 .000 
Pair 8 ALT2 - ALT5 -3.06E-03 1.34E-02 4.25E-03 -1.68E-02 1.07E-02 -.722 9 .489 
Pair 9 ALT2 - ALT6 6.02E-02 1.49E-02 4.71E-03 4.48E-02 7.55E-02 12.764 9 .000 
Pair 10 ALT3 - ALT4 2.40E-02 7.74E-03 2.44E-03 1.61E-02 3.20E-02 9.825 9 .000 
Pair 11 ALT3 - ALT5 -7.41E-02 7.74E-03 2.44E-03 -8.20E-02 -6.61E-02 -30.258 9 .000 
Pair 12 ALT3 - ALT6 -1.08E-02 8.64E-03 2.73E-03 -1.97E-02 -1.94E-03 -3.963 9 .003 
Pair 13 ALT4 - ALT5 -9.81E-02 1.07E-02 3.39E-03 -.109201 -8.71E-02 -28.939 9 .000 
Pair 14 ALT4 - ALT6 -3.48E-02 8.45E-03 2.67E-03 -4.35E-02 -2.61E-02 -13.043 9 .000 
Pair 15 ALT5 - ALT6 6.32E-02 7.03E-03 2.22E-03 5.60E-02 7.05E-02 28.435 9 .000 
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Ranking Alternatives 
1 Alt 2≅ Alt 5 
2 Alt 6 
3 Alt 3 
4 Alt 1≅ Alt 4 
Figure 6.1. The pairwise comparisons of alternatives and ranking of alternatives for  
                   ratio of illegal infiltrations caught performance measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranking Alternatives 
1 Alt 6 
2 Alt 3 
3 Alt 5 
4 Alt 1≅ Alt 2≅ Alt 4 
 
Figure 6.2.The pairwise comparisons of alternatives and ranking of alternatives for DOC 
                   
Alt1 
Alt3 
Alt2 Alt4 
Alt5 
Alt6 
Alt1 
Alt3 
Alt2 Alt4 
Alt5 
Alt6 
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Ranking Alternatives 
1 Alt 2≅  Alt 5 
2 Alt 1≅ Alt 4 
3 Alt 3≅ Alt 6 
 
 
Figure 6.3. The pairwise comparisons of alternatives and ranking of alternatives for FOC 
                     
 
           As seen in Figures 6.1-6.3, the second and the fifth alternatives are better than 
others for ROIIC and FOC. Alternative 6 and alternative 3 are in the second and third 
row for ROIIC, respectively. But they are the last for FOC. On the other hand, sixth 
alternative is the best and third alternative is the second for DOC. This shows that 
ranking of alternatives are not consistent for each performance measure. 
We observe that when resources are increased coordination gets importance for 
both DOC and ROIIC. Because, the sixth alternative is better than the third alternative 
for both performance measures.  
 
Alt1 
Alt3 
Alt2 Alt4 
Alt5 
Alt6 
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6.2.2. Rinott’s Procedure 
 Although we made all pairwise comparisons, we couldn’t rank the alternatives to 
find the best alternative. Then, we apply Rinott’s ranking and selection procedure (1978). 
We first find the required number of replications for each alternative. The required 
numbers of replications are presented with results of alternatives in Appendix E (Tables 
E.1-E.3). Then we calculate the average of replications and select the alternative with the 
highest average as the best one. 
In our study, we take h10, 0.05 = 3.859 and indifference amount value (d) for the 
ROIIC and DOC performance measures 0.005 whereas 10 for the FOC performance 
measure. The rankings of alternatives for each performance measure are presented in 
Tables 6.2-6.4. 
 
Tables 6.2. Ranking of alternatives for ratio of illegal infiltrations caught 
 
 
 
Table 6.3. Ranking of alternatives for degree of controllability 
 
 
 
 
Ranking Alternatives Values 
1 Alternative 5 0.634905 
2 Alternative 2 0.631838 
3 Alternative 6 0.571622 
4 Alternative 3 0.560787 
5 Alternative 4 0.536729 
6 Alternative 1 0.530754 
Ranking Alternatives Values 
1 Alternative 6 0.29563 
2 Alternative 3 0.284504 
3 Alternative 5 0.226022 
4 Alternative 4 0.223901 
5 Alternative 2 0.221825 
6 Alternative 1 0.21961 
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Table 6.4. Ranking of alternatives for frequency of controlling 
 
As seen in Tables 6.2-6.4, alternative 6 is the best for DOC and alternative 3 
follows it. But, alternative 6 is the last for FOC. Alternative 5 is the best for ROIIC and 
alternative 2 follows it. On the other hand, second alternative is the best for FOC and the 
fifth alternative follows it. All these results indicate that ranking of alternatives are not 
consistent for each performance measure. 
We also observe that coordination is important to increase performance measures 
for both the DOC and ROIIC performance measures. Because, alternative 4 is better than 
alternative 1 and alternative 6 is better than alternative 3 for both ROIIC and DOC. 
In both ranking and selection procedures, we observe that the ranking of 
alternatives are not consistent for each performance measure. Moreover, we have one 
more criterion that will effect the decision beyond the performance measures; cost of 
alternatives. Thus, we decide to apply multi-criteria decision-making procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranking Alternatives Values 
1 Alternative 2 3153 
2 Alternative 5 3146 
3 Alternative 1 2046 
4 Alternative 4 2045 
5 Alternative 3 1877 
6 Alternative 6 1865 
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6.3.  Implementation of Geometric Mean Technique for our 
        Multi-criteria Decision-making Problem     
         We decide to implement geometric mean technique to our multi-criteria decision-
making problem. Although there are many multi-criteria decision-making methods in the 
literature, we choose geometric mean technique.  The geometric mean is the way to solve 
pairwise comparison matrices. Barzilai, et al. (1987) identified desired properties of this 
solution technique. We use geometric mean technique suggested by H.A. Eiselt (course 
handouts in Bilkent University 2001) 
 
             In the first step we construct our hierarchy tree as seen in Figure 6.5. 
                                                             
       Goal: Rank the alternatives 
 
 
 
 
Criteria: Ratio of illegal  Degree of Frequency of    Cost 
 infiltrations caught controllability             controlling  
 
 
 
Alternatives: 1  2     3     4    5    6   1  2     3     4    5    6   1  2     3     4    5   6   1   2     3    4   5    6 
 
Figure 6.4. Hierarchy tree of alternatives and criteria 
 
           
In the second step, the pairwise comparisons of alternatives are made for each 
criterion. Therefore, we construct our pairwise comparison matrices. In this step, since 
we know the border security system simulation results for each alternative, we can easily 
compare alternatives with each other for any criterion only by determining how much 
important the difference between the lowest and the highest score of alternatives. After 
consulting military experts, we give importance degree 5 “essentially more important” 
for the difference between the alternative with the lowest score and the alternative with 
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 the highest score. Then, we make pairwise comparisons of alternatives and we construct 
matrices according to values of simulation results. In Table 6.5, results of each 
alternative for each criterion are presented. The matrices that show the pairwise 
comparisons of alternatives are in Appendix E (Tables E.6a-E.6d).  
 
 
Table 6.5. Results of each alternative for each criterion 
 (*) Costs of alternatives are calculated as million $ for one-year time period (note that 
costs are calculated according to price of thermal camera (0.13 million $), price of 
askarad (0.24 million $) and amount of fuel needed for motorized patrols.) 
 
In the third step, we construct pairwise comparison matrix for the criterions. We 
have four criterions, so we construct four by four pairwise comparison matrix. In this 
step, we consulted military experts for pairwise comparisons of criteria. The pairwise 
comparisons of criteria are presented in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6. Pairwise comparison matrix of criteria 
criteria 
 
alternatives 
Ratio of illegal 
infiltrations 
caught 
Degree of 
controllability 
Frequency of 
controlling 
Cost* 
1 0.53075 0.21961 2046.64 0.04 
2 0.63184 0.22183 3153.56 0.055 
3 0.56079 0.2845 1877.88 0.075 
4 0.53673 0.2239 2045.77 0.04 
5 0.63491 0.22602 3146.43 0.055 
6 0.57162 0.29256 1865.71 0.075 
Criteria 
Ratio of illegal 
infiltrations 
caught 
Degree of 
controllability 
Frequency of 
controlling cost 
Ratio of illegal 
infiltrations caught 1.0000 2.5000 2.2500 1.2500 
Degree of 
controllability 0.4000 1.0000 0.8600 0.4500 
Frequency of 
controlling 0.4444 1.1628 1.0000 0.6000 
cost 0.8000 2.2222 1.6667 1.0000 
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         In the fourth step, we construct the utility matrix by taking geometric means of each 
row of matrices that we construct in the second step. For example, we calculate the 
geometric mean of first row of ROIIC matrix (Table E.6a in Appendix E) as 0.426605 
and place it first row and first column of utility matrix and we calculate the geometric 
mean of second row of ROIIC matrix as 2.50834 and place it second row and first 
column of utility matrix. Meanwhile, we construct weight matrix by taking the geometric 
means of each row of pairwise comparison matrix of criteria and normalizing the results. 
In Tables 6.7-6.8 utility matrix and weight matrix (before and after normalization) are 
presented. 
Table 6.7. Utility matrix 
Alternatives 
Ratio of illegal 
infiltrations 
caught 
Degree of 
controllability 
Frequency of 
controlling cost 
1 0.426605 0.534898 0.703763 2.369284 
2 2.50834 0.579024 2.806936 1.077307 
3 0.766993 2.520356 0.509854 0.391552 
4 0.480913 0.625656 0.703144 2.370273 
5 2.603455 0.675191 2.798679 1.077937 
6 0.973224 3.032556 0.504556 0.391617 
 
Table 6.8. Weight matrix 
 
In the fifth and the last step, we take the weight powers of each alternative row in 
the utility matrix and calculate values of each alternative. Then, we normalize the values.  
 
 
 
Ratio of illegal 
infiltrations 
caught 
Degree of 
controllability 
Frequency of 
controlling cost 
Weights before 
normalization 1.628389 0.627253 0.746204 1.311996 
Weights after 
normalization 0.37748 0.145405 0.172979 0.304136 
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The mathematical expression of calculation for alternative 1 is as follow:  
     V(alt1)= 0.4266050,37748 x 0.5348980,145405 x 0.7037630,172979 x 2.3692840,304136 = 0,809794 
Values of each alternative are presented in Table 6.9 and ranking of alternatives is 
presented in Table 6.10. 
                         Table 6.9. Values of alternatives 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6.10. Ranking of alternatives 
 
As seen in Table 6.10, alternative 5 is the best alternative. It shows us the 
importance of motorized type of patrols and coordination between security elements in 
the system. We also see the importance of coordination by observing alternative 4 in the 
third row of ranking. On the other hand, alternatives that need additional high-tech 
devices (alternatives 6 and 3) are not preferred because of their high costs. But, if new 
high-tech devices are added to the system, coordination must be established between 
security elements. 
 
 
 
Before 
normalization 
After 
normalization 
 
V(alt1) 0.809794 0.126509 
V(alt2) 1.59818 0.249674 
V(alt3) 0.69252 0.108188 
V(alt4) 0.866771 0.13541 
V(alt5) 1.65686 0.258841 
V(alt6) 0.776948 0.121378 
Ranking Alternatives Values 
1 Alternative 5 0.258841 
2 Alternative 2 0.249674 
3 Alternative 4 0.13541 
4 Alternative 1 0.126509 
5 Alternative 6 0.121378 
6 Alternative 3 0.108188 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Conclusion 
7.1. Summary 
In this thesis, we give brief information about how Turkey protects and control 
her land borders (border security system in Turkey). We first present a literature survey. 
Then, we define necessary components of the system and their interactions, which are all 
needed to develop a simulation model of border security system. We present our 
objectives to perform such a study and model development of the system. Our main aim 
is to find out possible ways of increasing border control and security along the land 
borders of Turkey. Therefore, we try to: (1) understand the behavior of the system, (2) 
observe the relationships between security elements and performance measures and 
relationships between performance measures, (3) find-out effect of each security element 
on the performance measures, (4) analyze factors that effect the performance measures, 
(5) investigate system responses, when changes made in the system or new resources 
added to the system, (6) evaluate different alternatives which improve the performance 
measures, by using ranking-selection and multi-criteria decision-making procedures. We 
try to achieve our objectives by modeling and analysis of operational activities of typical 
Border Company supported by Border Battalion via simulation. We analyze the outputs 
by using performance measures: (1) ratio-of-illegal-infiltrations-caught, (2) degree-of-
controllability, (3) frequency-of-controlling. 
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7.2. Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
1. The behavior of the system in terms of DOC, FOC and ROIIC are not uniform 
along the border. This is due to different use of security elements in different 
zones and different mobility characteristics of security elements. We can adjust 
DOC by using flexible use of security elements.  It gives us the opportunity to 
control some part of our borders (critical zones) at high level. Ambushes are the 
most appropriate resource for controlling critical zones at high level. Therefore, 
training of ambushes must be given importance. 
2. Patrols are the main security element for frequency of controlling the zones. 
Therefore, precautions for increasing the mobility of patrols must be taken (i.e., 
increasing the number of motorized patrols). 
3. It is difficult to catch enemy special forces and terrorist type of infiltrations. To 
increase catching probability of these infiltrations, importance should be given to 
build physical obstacles along the borders. These obstacles increase infiltration 
time; so probability of catching illegal infiltrations increases. 
4. There is a direct relation between DOC and ROIIC. But, ROIIC does not improve 
proportionally with DOC; that is by increasing the quantity of high-tech devices 
we don’t necessarily prevent infiltrations on the borderlines. We know that 
increasing DOC needs more high-tech devices and this causes increase in the cost 
of border security. Therefore, appropriate quantity of high-tech devices must be 
identified for each border troop and ambushes must be used for controlling zones 
that cannot be controlled by high-tech devices. 
5. There is also a direct relation between FOC and ROIIC. But, ROIIC does not 
improve proportionally with FOC. Therefore, border security planners must 
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identify the appropriate capacity of patrol and precautions such as increasing the 
mobility of patrols and building of physical obstacles must be taken to maximize 
ROIIC. Such precautions also deter the infiltrations along the border.  
6. Each of security element (patrols, ambushes, thermal camera, askarad) has 
statistically significant effect on each performance measure with its existence 
when compared to its absence in the system. 
7. We analyze the factors that affect the performance measures. All factors have 
significant effects on each of the performance measures. In Table 7.1, a summary 
is presented. In Table 7.2, factors and their descriptions are given. 
Table 7.1 Factors affecting the performance measures. 
(*) improvement indicates the change in performance measure when we change the 
factor from its low level to high level. 
 
        
            Table 7.2  Factors and their descriptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance Measures Significant Factors Improvement* 
Ratio of illegal infiltrations 
caught 
A, B, C, D, E 5%, 3%,  1%, 13%, 1% 
Degree of controllability A, B, C, D, E 28%, 10%,  -1%,  1%,  6%
Frequency of controlling A, B, C, D, E -8%, -3%,  4%,  38%,  -4%
Factor Factor Description 
A The degree of use of high-tech devices 
B The degree of use of night-vision tools  
C Determination of stationary or moving characteristics of duty 
D The degree of use of motorized patrols 
E Duty time of patrols 
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According to these results, border troops have to use high-tech devices more          
frequently, increase the duty time of patrols, and increase mobility of all security 
elements along the borders to increase the security of land borders. 
8. Another way of increasing border security is to establish coordination between 
security elements. Coordination increases degree of controllability by preventing 
control of same zones by two or more security elements at the same time. 
9. We evaluate different alternatives by using ranking, selection and multi-criteria 
decision-making procedures to give an idea about how border security system 
simulation model supports the decision-making process before conducting real 
decisions. Alternative description and ranking of alternatives are presented in 
Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3. Alternative description and ranking of alternatives  
Ranking Alternative Alternative description Value 
1 Alternative 5 
System that coordination is established and all 
patrols are motorized 0.258841
2 Alternative 2 
System that all patrols are motorized 0.249674
3 Alternative 4 
System that coordination is established between 
security elements 0.13541 
4 Alternative 1 
Benchmark system 0.126509
5 Alternative 6 
System that coordination is established and one 
more askarad and one more thermal camera added 0.121378
6 Alternative 3 
System with one more askarad and one more 
thermal camera 0.108188
 
When we look at the results, alternative 5 (system that coordination is established 
and all patrols are motorized) is preferred to other alternatives when we consider 
criterions: ratio-of-illegal-infiltrations-caught, degree-of-controllability, frequency-of-
controlling and cost. 
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10. We know that additional security elements cause an increase in the cost of 
security of borders. On the other hand, like almost all countries in the world, 
we try to control our land borders at high level with limited resources. 
Therefore, before conducting real investments or changes to increase border 
security, we have to analyze utilities of additional resources or changes in the 
system in terms of performance measures and their costs for each border 
troop. Thus, the requirements of each border troop are evaluated more 
accurately and investments are made more useful. 
 
           Future Research Directions 
Although the main task of border troops is protection and security of borders in 
their responsibility terrain, they have another tasks. They also perform some activities 
that support execution of their tasks. Furthermore, operational activities for control and 
security of borders may be analyzed under different conditions. Followings are the some 
topics that can be investigated by future studies. 
1. Border security can be analyzed under situation of any strained relation with 
neighbor country before war, by considering the troops located very near to 
borders. 
2. In our study, we analyze border security system under night conditions. The 
system can be analyzed under day conditions or under both night and day 
conditions. 
3. One of the main tasks of border troops is collection of intelligence by close 
watching the terrain of neighbor country. The research can be conducted on 
this task of border troops. 
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4. We know that border troops are located in such a way that they execute their 
tasks best under peace and war conditions. But, by considering the 
developing technology and change in the regional threats, the locations of 
border troops at all levels can be analyzed. 
5. Logistic activities of border troops can be analyzed. 
6. Communication systems of border troops can be analyzed.
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APPENDIX A 
 
Confidence Intervals 
 
 
                 
     Table A.1a. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of Border Company 
 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of Border 
Company 
0.219926 0.003599 1.2x10-5 0.22536 
C.I low  0.218355 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 
C.I high 0.221496 0.214400 0.219491 
C.I low  0.217843 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 
C.I high 0.222008 10  
C.I low  0.216716   
C.I. withα = 0.01 
C.I high 0.223135   
 
 
    Table A.1b. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of Border Company 
 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of Border 
Company 2025 8.63111 74.496 2036.583 
C.I low 2021.23 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 
C.I high 2028.76 2008.036 2025.595 
C.I low 2020.005 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 
C.I high 2029.99 10  
C.I low 2017.303   C.I. withα = 0.01 
C.I high 2032.696   
 
 
    Table A.1c. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of Border Company 
 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for  ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of Border Company 0.530754 0.009157 8.38x10-5 0.5402 
C.I low 0.5267 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 
C.I high 0.5347 0.5126 0.533527 
C.I low 0.5254 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 
C.I high 0.5360 10  
C.I low 0.5225   C.I. withα = 0.01 
C.I high 0.5389   
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Table A.2a. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of Border Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2b. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of Border Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2c. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of Border Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of Border 
Company 0.219926 0.081316 0.006612 0.40744 
C.I low 0.184440 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 
C.I high 0.255411 0.04871 0.19374 
C.I low 0.17228   C.I. with α = 0.05 
C.I high 0.2669   
C.I low 0.1474   C.I. withα = 0.01 
C.I high 0.2924   
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of Border 
Company 2025 668.71 447177.55 3021.2 
C.I low 1733 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 
C.I high 2316 782.4 2003.7 
C.I low 1638   C.I. with α = 0.05 
C.I high 2411   
C.I low 1428   C.I. withα = 0.01 
C.I high 2621   
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of Border Company 0.5307 0.129745 0.01683 0.7509 
C.I low 0.4600 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 
C.I high 0.5732 0.2377 0.5175 
C.I low 0.4415   C.I. with α = 0.05 
C.I high 0.5917   
C.I low 0.4009   C.I. withα = 0.01 
C.I high 0.6323   
 99
 
 
      
     Table A.3a. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of 1st Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of 1st Border 
Platoon 0.228424 0.004328 1.88x10
-5 0.234066 
C.I low  0.226530 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.230316 0.223057 0.22797 
C.I low  0.2259 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.2309 10  
C.I low  0.2245   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.2322   
 
   Table A.3b. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of 2nd  Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of 2nd Border 
Platoon 0.206546 0.007785 6.06x10
-5 0.215041 
C.I low  0.203148 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.2099431 0.190449 0.206313 
C.I low  0.202040 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.211050 10  
C.I low  0.199603   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.213488   
 
    Table A.3c. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of 3rd  Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of 3rd Border 
Platoon 0.204612 0.012994 0.000168857 0.231256 
C.I low 0.198940 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.210282 0.189159 0.202072 
C.I low 0.197091 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.212131 10  
C.I low 0.192023   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.216199   
 
    Table A.3d. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of 4th  Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of 4th Border 
Platoon 0.230055 0.007673 5.88x10
-5 0.240085 
C.I low 0.2267064 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.233403 0.218417 0.227496 
C.I low 0.225614 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.234494 10  
C.I low 0.223212   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.236896   
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    Table A.4a. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of 1st Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of 1st Border 
Platoon 2551.704 24.56574 603.475 2598.625 
C.I low  2540.98 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 2562.42 2521.708 2554.167 
C.I low  2537.48 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 2565.91 10  
C.I low  2529.79   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 2573.79   
 
   Table A.4b. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of 2nd  Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of 2nd Border 
Platoon 1384.906 16.89975 285.60163 1413.222 
C.I low  1377.53 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 1392.28 1356.667 1385.25 
C.I low  1375.12 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 1394.68 10  
C.I low  1369.83   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 1399.97   
 
     
    Table A.4c. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of 3rd Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of 3rd Border 
Platoon 1355.389 25.32789 641.502141 1391.167 
C.I low 1344.33 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 1366.44 1304.5 1353.778 
C.I low 1340.73 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 1370.04 10  
C.I low 1332.80   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 1377.97   
 
    Table A.4d. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of  4th  Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of 4th Border 
Platoon 2478.054 31.22418 974.949 2522.5 
C.I low 2464.42 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 2491.68 2444.833 2468.896 
C.I low 2459.98 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 2496.12 10  
C.I low 2450.20   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 2505.89   
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    Table A.5a. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of 1st Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of 1st Border Platoon 0.62223 0.010393 0.000108 0.6346 
C.I low 0.617695 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.626765 0.6013 0.62435 
C.I low 0.616216 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.628244 10  
C.I low 0.613751   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.630709   
 
   Table A.5b. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of 2nd Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of 2nd Border 
Platoon 0.41682 0.014522 0.000211 0.4355 
C.I low 0.410483 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.423157 0.3899 0.416 
C.I low 0.408416 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.425224 10  
C.I low 0.404972   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.428668   
 
    Table A.5c. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of 3rd Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of 3rd Border Platoon 0.42527 0.010908 0.000119 0.4428 
C.I low 0.42051 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.43003 0.4085 0.4248 
C.I low 0.418958 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.431582 10  
C.I low 0.416371   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.434169   
 
 
   Table A.5d. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of 4th  Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of 4th Border Platoon 0.60951 0.014094 0.000199 0.6379 
C.I low 0.603359 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.615661 0.5927 0.6058 
C.I low 0.601354 # of reps  C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.617666 10  
C.I low 0.598011   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.621009   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 102
 
                        
      
      
   Table A.6a. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of 1st Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of 1st Border 
Platoon 0.229801 0.078603 0.00617 0.40744 
C.I low  0.1954 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.2641 0.13799 0.1994 
C.I low  0.1843   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.2752   
C.I low  0.1597   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.29989   
 
    Table A.6b. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of 2nd  Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of 2nd Border 
Platoon 0.206817 0.05906 0.003488 0.30644 
C.I low  0.18104 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.23259 0.13983 0.20411 
C.I low  0.1726   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.2409   
C.I low  0.15414   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.25948   
 
 
     Table A.6c. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of 3rd  Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of 3rd Border 
Platoon 0.205268 0.086262 0.00744 0.37662 
C.I low 0.1676 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.2429 0.04871 0.183445 
C.I low 0.15534   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.25518   
C.I low 0.12834   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.28219   
 
   Table A.6d. Confidence interval for degree of controllability of 4th  Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for degree of 
controllability of 4th Border 
Platoon 0.230876 0.095265 0.0090754 0.40729 
C.I low 0.1893 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.2724 0.11173 0.196955 
C.I low 0.1757   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.2860   
C.I low 0.1459   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.3158   
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    Table A.7a. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of 1st Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of 1st Border 
Platoon 2554 419.72 176165 3021,2 
C.I low  2371.061 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 2737.388 1496.2 2676.45 
C.I low  2311.353   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 2797.11   
C.I low  2179.93   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 2928.51   
 
    Table A.7b. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of 2nd Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of 2nd Border 
Platoon 1384 228.85 52373 1558.3 
C.I low  1285.036 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 1484.77 783.2 1445.35 
C.I low  1252.46   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 1517.34   
C.I low  1180.82   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 1588.98   
 
    Table A.7c. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of 3rd Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of 3rd Border 
Platoon 1355.389 229.10 52515 1554.4 
C.I low 1255.38 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 1455.39 782 1460.85 
C.I low 1222.77   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 1488.004   
C.I low 1151.03   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 1559.74   
 
    Table A.7d. Confidence interval for frequency of controlling of 4th Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for frequency of 
controlling of 4th Border 
Platoon 2478.054 426.66 182040 2883 
C.I low 2291.86 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 2664.24 1405 2703 
C.I low 2231.14   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 2724.96   
C.I low 2097.57   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 2858.53   
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    Table A.8a. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of 1st Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of 1st Border Platoon 0.612692 0.086094 0.007412 0.750947 
C.I low  0.575121 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.650263 0.415205 0.616655 
C.I low  0.56287   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.662514   
C.I low  0.542451   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.682933   
 
   Table A.8b. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of 2nd Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of 2nd Border 
Platoon 0.408197 0.059784 0.003574 0.501923 
C.I low  0.382108 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.434287 0.324786 0.393899 
C.I low  0.3736   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.442794   
C.I low  0.359421   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.456973   
 
   Table A.8c. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of 3rd Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of 3rd Border Platoon 0.403534 0.089748 0.008055 0.57449 
C.I low 0.364368 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.442699 0.237726 0.389129 
C.I low 0.351597   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.45547   
C.I low 0.330311   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.476756   
 
    Table A.8d. Confidence interval for ratio of ill. inf. caught of 4th Border Platoon 
Average Std.Dev. Var Max C.I for ratio of ill. inf. 
caught of 4th Border Platoon 0.586799 0.103741 0.010762 0.739563 
C.I low 0.541527 Min Median C.I with α = 0.1 C.I high 0.632071 0.313889 0.601088 
C.I low 0.526764   C.I. with α = 0.05 C.I high 0.646834   
C.I low 0.50216   C.I. withα = 0.01 C.I high 0.671438   
 
 
 105
APPENDIX   B 
 
Results of 24 Factorial Design Experiments and ANOVA 
  
Table B.1. Results, averages, variances of 10 replications for ratio of illegal infiltrations caught  
 
 
 
 
Table B.2. Results, averages, variances of 10 replications for degree of controllability 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 
1 0 0.448087 0.130935 0.072066 0.056958 0.496378 0.469979 0.474891 
2 0 0.429372 0.142152 0.082334 0.0625 0.497991 0.464605 0.42855 
3 0 0.433307 0.139466 0.07812 0.050668 0.504337 0.463363 0.472713 
4 0 0.44136 0.141461 0.078015 0.064222 0.497698 0.461601 0.472046 
5 0 0.43423 0.139213 0.069696 0.067648 0.498796 0.468387 0.459366 
6 0 0.437652 0.135028 0.073272 0.068949 0.5 0.458956 0.466901 
7 0 0.444955 0.138722 0.067336 0.059843 0.50875 0.472036 0.462775 
8 0 0.445204 0.139442 0.077943 0.047028 0.495003 0.472765 0.465556 
9 0 0.427238 0.133599 0.065675 0.059072 0.494332 0.466989 0.468512 
10 0 0.439906 0.141223 0.075072 0.065092 0.499174 0.458063 0.45374 
Average 0 0.438131 0.138124 0.073953 0.060198 0.499246 0.465674 0.462505 
Variance 0 4.93E-05 1.38E-05 2.84E-05 5.04E-05 1.90E-05 2.72E-05 0.000184 
 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 1234 
1 0.192151 0.184588 0.117174 0.516901 0.515058 0.484028 0.211646 0.512616 
2 0.185851 0.176962 0.126311 0.520032 0.510769 0.491296 0.212563 0.537588 
3 0.177659 0.171885 0.116074 0.514115 0.505498 0.501544 0.207034 0.537792 
4 0.182097 0.17076 0.111463 0.518676 0.515241 0.484506 0.219484 0.519941 
5 0.185714 0.16848 0.110305 0.52283 0.513219 0.490894 0.219291 0.540292 
6 0.185535 0.167601 0.114854 0.524295 0.510275 0.484804 0.21728 0.534402 
7 0.180613 0.164592 0.117404 0.519587 0.512203 0.489137 0.210475 0.529684 
8 0.191681 0.178076 0.112725 0.501465 0.509987 0.484265 0.208048 0.524113 
9 0.184074 0.180006 0.104732 0.522665 0.519328 0.4987 0.212655 0.538462 
10 0.185173 0.178981 0.118948 0.524136 0.516557 0.486609 0.2085 0.532653 
Average 0.185055 0.174193 0.114999 0.51847 0.512814 0.489578 0.212698 0.530754 
Variance 2.00E-05 3.73E-05 3.34E-05 4.63E-05 1.56E-05 3.86E-05 2.09E-05 8.39E-05 
 0 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 
1 0 0.069018 0.081333 0.057195 0.042827 0.145658 0.121868 0.103541 
2 0 0.06913 0.082125 0.059476 0.048665 0.144947 0.118432 0.111022 
3 0 0.068959 0.084224 0.052582 0.041151 0.144601 0.117278 0.108363 
4 0 0.069241 0.081836 0.058481 0.047637 0.145486 0.120429 0.112235 
5 0 0.068903 0.083361 0.057782 0.046933 0.145082 0.11673 0.111932 
6 0 0.069166 0.085441 0.057016 0.048425 0.144318 0.118101 0.108267 
7 0 0.069045 0.081919 0.058438 0.040702 0.144366 0.115304 0.109941 
8 0 0.06906 0.083485 0.04978 0.040034 0.143287 0.120525 0.110942 
9 0 0.06887 0.082779 0.058207 0.036468 0.145325 0.115646 0.104907 
10 0 0.068728 0.08267 0.053631 0.048638 0.145838 0.120366 0.108075 
Average 0 0.069012 0.082917 0.056259 0.044148 0.144891 0.118468 0.108923 
Variance 0 2.33E-08 1.55E-06 1.00E-05 1.97E-05 5.92E-07 5.09E-06 8.46E-06 
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Table B.2. (con’t) Results, averages, variances of 10 replications for degree of controllability 
 
 
 
 
Table B.3. Results, averages, variances of 10 replications for frequency of controlling 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 1234 
1 0.131854 0.12621 0.091943 0.187203 0.178803 0.155931 0.161536 0.22264 
2 0.132414 0.121654 0.088081 0.189805 0.173155 0.159931 0.170091 0.219036 
3 0.13212 0.124421 0.094815 0.186944 0.179337 0.160242 0.172562 0.223063 
4 0.129725 0.125804 0.101666 0.190915 0.178107 0.155173 0.165677 0.217875 
5 0.131305 0.121155 0.091533 0.187944 0.176703 0.158473 0.163411 0.221235 
6 0.127844 0.121208 0.099247 0.18597 0.178424 0.160534 0.174229 0.218774 
7 0.130041 0.129148 0.083495 0.187385 0.188905 0.157011 0.168379 0.219083 
8 0.130816 0.120284 0.085139 0.191626 0.187388 0.1516 0.162897 0.225416 
9 0.132133 0.11801 0.097332 0.186539 0.178741 0.149081 0.15695 0.218195 
10 0.130607 0.118521 0.095468 0.188057 0.178536 0.159707 0.166425 0.210782 
Average 0.130886 0.122642 0.092872 0.188239 0.17981 0.156768 1.66E-01 0.21961 
Variance 1.99E-06 1.31E-05 3.57E-05 3.64E-06 2.25E-05 1.52E-05 2.79E-05 1.57E-05 
 0 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 
1 0 2391.393 64.17857 39.22619 32.28571 2231.845 2297.881 2347.238 
2 0 2425.881 63.33333 38.96429 36.10714 2242.179 2304.643 2318.226 
3 0 2397.988 62.47619 36.08333 29.35714 2237.155 2295.988 2331.262 
4 0 2418.714 65.52381 38.70238 36.19048 2244.536 2291.476 2317.571 
5 0 2422.857 67.33333 38.41667 38.7619 2251.393 2313.083 2315.345 
6 0 2428.036 65.52381 38.5119 35.28571 2245.417 2301.405 2331.583 
7 0 2415.119 64.65476 37.85714 26.20238 2227.726 2311.393 2326.512 
8 0 2413.857 65.25 33.03571 31.04762 2247.333 2269.917 2312.762 
9 0 2414 66.60714 37.7381 28.29762 2243.214 2283.762 2319.905 
10 0 2396.619 65.17857 36.02381 36.67857 2251.929 2286.107 2327.321 
Average 0 2412.446 65.00595 37.45595 33.02143 2242.273 2295.565 2324.773 
Variance 0 165.0589 2.067941 3.634954 17.52191 62.71672 175.8651 106.0286 
 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 1234 
1 93.9881 99.33333 65.40476 2126.179 2147.405 2215.131 121.4167 2045.583 
2 96.03571 93.5 60.61905 2103.774 2184.679 2204.012 125.631 2038.583 
3 96.04762 91.07143 75.17857 2108.619 2161.786 2201.56 126.5238 2034.048 
4 94.47619 98.54762 71.29762 2123.214 2168.286 2217.845 121.9762 2037.25 
5 96.97619 96.25 65.44048 2127.75 2174.298 2226.679 120.6429 2054.333 
6 94.10714 94.53571 72.88095 2123.964 2153.119 2209.083 129.5476 2046.536 
7 99.13095 94.65476 57.79762 2127.714 2127.786 2208.595 128.4286 2045.75 
8 96.78571 90.54762 60.77381 2098.488 2148.952 2220.44 124.0357 2030.798 
9 99.34524 87.88095 69.78571 2123.798 2182.19 2223.298 119.2381 2034.048 
10 94.90476 92.69048 66.2381 2122.69 2174.905 2213.881 118.1905 2099.476 
Average 96.17976 93.90119 66.54167 2118.619 2162.34 2214.052 123.5631 2046.64 
Variance 3.71071 12.74543 32.8141 115.7736 323.4316 68.07065 15.1085 397.1077 
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Table B.4. ANOVA results of ratio of illegal infiltrations caught performance measure 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Eta Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power 
Corrected 
Model 5.902 15 .393 9371.222 .000 .999 140568.325 1.000 
Intercept 14.862 1 14.862 353987.534 .000 1.000 353987.534 1.000 
A 5.468 1 5.468 130248.673 .000 .999 130248.673 1.000 
B .277 1 .277 6609.211 .000 .979 6609.211 1.000 
C 5.851E-02 1 5.851E-02 1393.640 .000 .906 1393.640 1.000 
D 3.573E-02 1 3.573E-02 850.936 .000 .855 850.936 1.000 
A * B 4.081E-02 1 4.081E-02 971.977 .000 .871 971.977 1.000 
A * C 9.365E-03 1 9.365E-03 223.052 .000 .608 223.052 1.000 
B * C 2.308E-03 1 2.308E-03 54.976 .000 .276 54.976 1.000 
A * B * C 4.182E-04 1 4.182E-04 9.961 .002 .065 9.961 .707 
A * D 5.156E-03 1 5.156E-03 122.805 .000 .460 122.805 1.000 
B * D 2.247E-03 1 2.247E-03 53.517 .000 .271 53.517 1.000 
A * B * D 1.426E-04 1 1.426E-04 3.397 .067 .023 3.397 .225 
C * D 5.377E-04 1 5.377E-04 12.807 .000 .082 12.807 .832 
A * C * D 4.168E-04 1 4.168E-04 9.928 .002 .064 9.928 .705 
B * C * D 6.141E-05 1 6.141E-05 1.463 .228 .010 1.463 .084 
A * B * C * D 8.322E-05 1 8.322E-05 1.982 .161 .014 1.982 .118 
Error 6.046E-03 144 4.198E-05      
Total 20.770 160       
Corrected 
Total 5.908 159       
                           
 
 
 Table B.5. ANOVA results of degree of controllability performance measure 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Eta Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power 
Corrected 
Model .513 15 3.423E-02 3022.004 .000 .997 45330.063 1.000 
Intercept 2.213 1 2.213 195350.340 .000 .999 195350.340 1.000 
A .150 1 .150 13235.362 .000 .989 13235.362 1.000 
B .217 1 .217 19125.367 .000 .993 19125.367 1.000 
C 8.882E-02 1 8.882E-02 7840.755 .000 .982 7840.755 1.000 
D 5.637E-02 1 5.637E-02 4976.137 .000 .972 4976.137 1.000 
A * B 5.626E-04 1 5.626E-04 49.668 .000 .256 49.668 1.000 
A * C 1.615E-04 1 1.615E-04 14.258 .000 .090 14.258 .876 
B * C 4.759E-04 1 4.759E-04 42.009 .000 .226 42.009 1.000 
A * B * C 3.182E-07 1 3.182E-07 .028 .867 .000 .028 .011 
A * D 8.000E-05 1 8.000E-05 7.062 .009 .047 7.062 .520 
B * D 1.942E-04 1 1.942E-04 17.144 .000 .106 17.144 .935 
A * B * D 2.413E-05 1 2.413E-05 2.130 .147 .015 2.130 .129 
C * D 1.825E-04 1 1.825E-04 16.110 .000 .101 16.110 .918 
A * C * D 2.865E-05 1 2.865E-05 2.530 .114 .017 2.530 .158 
B * C * D 9.037E-07 1 9.037E-07 .080 .778 .001 .080 .013 
A * B * C * D 1.612E-05 1 1.612E-05 1.423 .235 .010 1.423 .081 
Error 1.631E-03 144 1.133E-05      
Total 2.728 160       
Corrected 
Total .515 159       
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Table B.6. ANOVA results of frequency of controlling performance measure 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Eta Squared
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power 
Corrected 
Model 
188166272.8
55 15 
12544418.19
0 133659.540 .000 1.000 2004893.103 1.000 
Intercept 210047565.042 1 
210047565.0
42 2238036.116 .000 1.000 2238036.116 1.000 
A 187078750.963 1 
187078750.9
63 1993305.665 .000 1.000 1993305.665 1.000 
B 118446.945 1 118446.945 1262.041 .000 .898 1262.041 1.000 
C 70200.459 1 70200.459 747.979 .000 .839 747.979 1.000 
D 25682.573 1 25682.573 273.645 .000 .655 273.645 1.000 
A * B 527385.757 1 527385.757 5619.243 .000 .975 5619.243 1.000 
A * C 224075.951 1 224075.951 2387.507 .000 .943 2387.507 1.000 
B * C 299.561 1 299.561 3.192 .076 .022 3.192 .209 
A * B * C 1.624 1 1.624 .017 .896 .000 .017 .011 
A * D 120716.000 1 120716.000 1286.217 .000 .899 1286.217 1.000 
B * D 81.905 1 81.905 .873 .352 .006 .873 .049 
A * B * D 333.644 1 333.644 3.555 .061 .024 3.555 .238 
C * D 46.944 1 46.944 .500 .481 .003 .500 .031 
A * C * D 239.168 1 239.168 2.548 .113 .017 2.548 .159 
B * C * D 11.113 1 11.113 .118 .731 .001 .118 .014 
A * B * C * D .249 1 .249 .003 .959 .000 .003 .010 
Error 13514.907 144 93.854      
Total 398227352.804 160       
Corrected 
Total 
188179787.7
62 159       
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APPENDIX  C 
 
25 Factorial Design Experiments and ANOVA Results 
 
Table C.1 Factors and roles of factors for design points (25 factorial design) 
 
 
Table C.2 Factors and roles of factors for design points (24 factorial design) 
 
 
 
 
 A B C D E DESIGN 
POINTS 
1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 
2 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 
3 -1 +1 -1 -1 -1 2 
4 -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 3 
5 -1 -1 -1 +1 -1 4 
6 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 5 
7 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 12 
8 +1 -1 +1 -1 -1 13 
9 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 14 
10 +1 -1 -1 -1 +1 15 
11 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 23 
12 -1 +1 -1 +1 -1 24 
13 -1 +1 -1 -1 +1 25 
14 -1 -1 +1 +1 -1 34 
15 -1 -1 +1 -1 +1 35 
16 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 45 
17 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 123 
18 +1 +1 -1 +1 -1 124 
19 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 125 
20 +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 134 
21 +1 -1 +1 -1 +1 135 
22 +1 -1 -1 +1 +1 145 
23 -1 +1 +1 +1 -1 234 
24 -1 +1 +1 -1 +1 235 
25 -1 +1 -1 +1 +1 245 
26 -1 -1 +1 +1 +1 345 
27 +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 1234 
28 +1 +1 +1 -1 +1 1235 
29 +1 +1 -1 +1 +1 1245 
30 +1 -1 +1 +1 +1 1345 
31 -1 +1 +1 +1 +1 2345 
32 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 12345 
 A B C D DESIGN POINTS 
1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0000 
2 +1 -1 -1 -1 1000 
3 -1 +1 -1 -1 0100 
4 -1 -1 +1 -1 0010 
5 -1 -1 -1 +1 0001 
6 +1 +1 -1 -1 1100 
7 +1 -1 +1 -1 1010 
8 +1 -1 -1 +1 1001 
9 -1 +1 +1 -1 0110 
10 -1 +1 -1 +1 0101 
11 -1 -1 +1 +1 0011 
12 +1 +1 +1 -1 1110 
13 +1 +1 -1 +1 1101 
14 +1 -1 +1 +1 1011 
15 -1 +1 +1 +1 0111 
16 +1 +1 +1 +1 1111 
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      Table C.3.  Results, averages, variances of 10 replications for ratio of illegal infiltrations            
                                  caught( 25 factorial design) 
 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 12 13 
1 0.50797 0.536617 0.530692 0.513751 0.572541 0.513905 0.565905 0.548488 
2 0.501053 0.52656 0.530516 0.515435 0.589198 0.522333 0.555648 0.541438 
3 0.516042 0.536174 0.537292 0.519805 0.584468 0.517958 0.567377 0.556981 
4 0.520521 0.531957 0.527971 0.511848 0.590549 0.518022 0.558687 0.540664 
5 0.515356 0.543608 0.543934 0.517749 0.575578 0.520066 0.566782 0.539574 
6 0.519265 0.516999 0.528333 0.521803 0.585989 0.526824 0.56225 0.545607 
7 0.519741 0.542768 0.517664 0.507774 0.580882 0.522749 0.551933 0.553551 
8 0.513058 0.540492 0.53821 0.520423 0.580265 0.52929 0.550725 0.543191 
9 0.513557 0.532507 0.536246 0.515289 0.593113 0.52332 0.555853 0.547284 
10 0.517398 0.533445 0.52965 0.511763 0.592017 0.519298 0.558442 0.539643 
average 0.514396 0.534113 0.532051 0.515564 0.58446 0.521377 0.55936 0.545642 
variance 3.60E-05 6.38E-05 5.24E-05 1.97E-05 4.95E-05 2.04E-05 3.64E-05 3.59E-05 
 14 15 23 24 25 34 35 45 
1 0.621683 0.549613 0.539512 0.617623 0.537261 0.591942 0.513809 0.584705 
2 0.63041 0.546005 0.535445 0.597333 0.532082 0.581651 0.518764 0.587682 
3 0.610114 0.548146 0.539997 0.599934 0.532811 0.601709 0.514961 0.579899 
4 0.602705 0.548475 0.533705 0.60588 0.524789 0.589195 0.521152 0.587827 
5 0.616826 0.547832 0.528691 0.600651 0.544164 0.584094 0.52662 0.593229 
6 0.611677 0.540487 0.532451 0.602472 0.537977 0.598482 0.501566 0.589565 
7 0.602464 0.557782 0.531607 0.607548 0.538934 0.590952 0.521527 0.584476 
8 0.61079 0.554501 0.530338 0.606764 0.527533 0.584367 0.529519 0.598648 
9 0.601779 0.54547 0.533366 0.592507 0.54065 0.591005 0.505802 0.602252 
10 0.610823 0.54419 0.527819 0.604938 0.539133 0.594167 0.515039 0.581539 
average 0.611927 0.54825 0.533293 0.603565 0.535533 0.590756 0.516876 0.588982 
variance 8.27E-05 2.46E-05 1.69E-05 4.61E-05 3.70E-05 4.04E-05 7.46E-05 5.19E-05 
 123 124 125 134 135 145 234 235 
1 0.572383 0.62232 0.554442 0.625325 0.545875 0.613222 0.60871 0.60871 
2 0.571755 0.616273 0.555937 0.610711 0.561825 0.621058 0.606214 0.606214 
3 0.566031 0.616575 0.562574 0.619024 0.551931 0.611462 0.608221 0.608221 
4 0.557895 0.620097 0.567581 0.610586 0.551936 0.606909 0.588051 0.588051 
5 0.560039 0.614412 0.569174 0.609829 0.550224 0.60871 0.599902 0.599902 
6 0.552405 0.610345 0.55116 0.61804 0.558969 0.611551 0.606208 0.606208 
7 0.562867 0.626164 0.552852 0.626177 0.549052 0.611393 0.61558 0.61558 
8 0.549901 0.618793 0.583278 0.618231 0.559791 0.604901 0.598363 0.598363 
9 0.564445 0.612706 0.551678 0.610304 0.5447 0.605043 0.602127 0.602127 
10 0.572741 0.622987 0.564107 0.618977 0.553328 0.603394 0.602987 0.602987 
average 0.563046 0.618067 0.561278 0.61672 0.552763 0.609764 0.603636 0.603636 
variance 6.55E-05 2.44E-05 0.000104 3.78E-05 3.38E-05 2.71E-05 5.44E-05 5.44E-05 
 245 345 1234 1235 1245 1345 2345 12345 
1 0.595676 0.592379 0.629497 0.567117 0.622245 0.615114 0.598791 0.626212 
2 0.603516 0.591412 0.629946 0.555298 0.623625 0.605845 0.612601 0.628514 
3 0.601914 0.601153 0.619134 0.566773 0.62929 0.615721 0.611012 0.631216 
4 0.587388 0.598494 0.615672 0.582047 0.626915 0.61334 0.607757 0.619378 
5 0.603404 0.598485 0.631448 0.568425 0.623514 0.617603 0.605542 0.621916 
6 0.600064 0.592854 0.634321 0.564686 0.618817 0.616836 0.609475 0.633777 
7 0.602074 0.593052 0.631553 0.562625 0.618038 0.620876 0.606369 0.622015 
8 0.607585 0.599967 0.617775 0.55741 0.624749 0.615681 0.605568 0.638464 
9 0.590338 0.591205 0.62097 0.558843 0.621098 0.621054 0.611851 0.631596 
10 0.607792 0.600131 0.622789 0.572089 0.631459 0.603523 0.600225 0.628534 
average 0.599975 0.595913 0.625311 0.565531 0.623975 0.614559 0.606919 0.628162 
variance 4.68E-05 1.64E-05 4.55E-05 6.14E-05 1.86E-05 3.32E-05 2.17E-05 3.52E-05 
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        Table C.4.  Results, averages, variances of 10 replications for degree of controllability            
                                      ( 25 factorial design) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 12 13 
1 0.197341 0.269063 0.218301 0.183315 0.195277 0.207598 0.276783 0.248519 
2 0.193539 0.256755 0.219473 0.192881 0.19698 0.212855 0.276428 0.264755 
3 0.190552 0.257957 0.215122 0.192056 0.193511 0.207762 0.279023 0.257564 
4 0.196897 0.250744 0.220514 0.201088 0.191854 0.209489 0.282344 0.255813 
5 0.201613 0.253922 0.222632 0.193822 0.193726 0.205358 0.280175 0.25905 
6 0.191938 0.25266 0.216304 0.192719 0.194247 0.210408 0.283868 0.25791 
7 0.191467 0.258895 0.211159 0.19196 0.197264 0.214408 0.277677 0.247639 
8 0.193704 0.252944 0.211774 0.18362 0.193883 0.210991 0.273047 0.252503 
9 0.192929 0.252185 0.220398 0.188516 0.200929 0.212034 0.281424 0.250273 
10 0.192637 0.253962 0.213967 0.192012 0.19271 0.203459 0.273066 0.256422 
average 0.194262 0.255909 0.216964 0.191199 0.195038 0.209436 0.278384 0.255045 
variance 1.14E-05 2.83E-05 1.53E-05 2.65E-05 7.23E-06 1.17E-05 1.36E-05 2.82E-05 
 14 15 23 24 25 34 35 45 
1 0.257703 0.272148 0.21448 0.223347 0.231943 0.190995 0.201941 0.208117 
2 0.260391 0.269645 0.219834 0.215485 0.230048 0.193472 0.20804 0.209839 
3 0.260358 0.275073 0.215792 0.212581 0.236455 0.196405 0.201927 0.213966 
4 0.264739 0.275265 0.208613 0.2206 0.232661 0.189171 0.208437 0.206238 
5 0.260084 0.272785 0.217013 0.221026 0.239 0.191155 0.198824 0.217815 
6 0.254765 0.262416 0.219573 0.22773 0.231614 0.192341 0.207571 0.208632 
7 0.259967 0.26063 0.21817 0.216163 0.232043 0.197449 0.203307 0.213177 
8 0.252563 0.269821 0.218925 0.226663 0.229171 0.1888 0.204073 0.206447 
9 0.261869 0.268496 0.218713 0.211122 0.230765 0.187881 0.207735 0.218469 
10 0.260777 0.27006 0.214263 0.217006 0.231748 0.199285 0.204702 0.20808 
average 0.259322 0.269634 0.216538 0.219172 0.232545 0.192695 0.204656 0.211078 
variance 1.22E-05 2.36E-05 1.18E-05 3.20E-05 8.87E-06 1.52E-05 1.05E-05 2.03E-05 
 123 124 125 134 135 145 234 235 
1 0.273957 0.282153 0.298008 0.258581 0.268143 0.273355 0.20964 0.222672 
2 0.278161 0.282323 0.293481 0.255104 0.270281 0.263868 0.214956 0.231513 
3 0.269145 0.277706 0.295304 0.247035 0.262435 0.272857 0.213598 0.221831 
4 0.276788 0.278876 0.291855 0.259229 0.263296 0.273373 0.216246 0.233171 
5 0.275508 0.283266 0.293255 0.26498 0.268735 0.275604 0.219197 0.228146 
6 0.272032 0.2793 0.292876 0.255156 0.261247 0.265877 0.214664 0.231566 
7 0.270823 0.283712 0.292464 0.259125 0.267298 0.264 0.214995 0.233911 
8 0.273587 0.275278 0.289493 0.262866 0.26626 0.270143 0.213662 0.227664 
9 0.276899 0.276838 0.283131 0.256107 0.270036 0.272217 0.215496 0.232832 
10 0.271376 0.277471 0.285223 0.258374 0.266605 0.269993 0.211113 0.224538 
average 0.273828 0.279693 0.291509 0.257656 0.266433 0.270129 0.214357 0.228784 
variance 8.90E-06 8.80E-06 2.00E-05 2.39E-05 9.95E-06 1.75E-05 7.00E-06 2.03E-05 
 245 345 1234 1235 1245 1345 2345 12345 
1 0.232519 0.20452 0.277233 0.281529 0.301006 0.260002 0.230763 0.292859 
2 0.240048 0.201451 0.270417 0.288332 0.29054 0.270364 0.228525 0.288539 
3 0.23554 0.203109 0.270945 0.286966 0.298648 0.266915 0.234393 0.285082 
4 0.235852 0.203583 0.277606 0.283649 0.297323 0.275027 0.238511 0.283206 
5 0.230961 0.210936 0.268219 0.287921 0.292641 0.265667 0.230071 0.2876 
6 0.231858 0.210657 0.272617 0.28674 0.291208 0.26064 0.233847 0.293653 
7 0.232789 0.206193 0.274757 0.292681 0.293963 0.269413 0.226046 0.287139 
8 0.237402 0.205357 0.270537 0.281928 0.291321 0.263775 0.227858 0.289023 
9 0.242475 0.207528 0.275855 0.284176 0.290278 0.263831 0.231825 0.281052 
10 0.234675 0.208571 0.275472 0.280198 0.286246 0.266806 0.233273 0.290628 
average 0.235412 0.206191 0.273366 0.285412 0.293317 0.266244 0.231511 0.287878 
variance 1.38E-05 1.02E-05 1.06E-05 1.45E-05 2.00E-05 2.08E-05 1.34E-05 1.60E-05 
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        Table C.5.  Results, averages, variances of 10 replications for frequency of controlling 
                                      ( 25 factorial design) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 12 13 
1 2022.702 1816.524 1955.536 2117.286 2843.286 1971.369 1837.464 1975.726 
2 2033.917 1871.833 1993.714 2092.976 2849.131 1951 1820.917 1918.393 
3 2026.048 1856.726 1971.607 2086.869 2863.762 1943.726 1815.917 1957.512 
4 2020.405 1889.679 1974.44 2055.833 2852.536 1957.25 1819.893 1937.857 
5 2008.595 1872.405 1955.702 2076.429 2875.667 1971.202 1842.94 1951.929 
6 2040.905 1872.762 1978.548 2094.762 2839.619 1954.988 1804.452 1950.631 
7 2039.036 1865.905 2000.679 2094.286 2809.607 1963.345 1830.095 1971.56 
8 2033.905 1882.94 1982.81 2101.298 2829.607 1955.619 1831.262 1999.095 
9 2032.048 1877.226 1959.488 2094.345 2846.714 1956.762 1827.417 1981.869 
10 2032.31 1891.107 1973.44 2093.298 2863.25 1962.321 1849.56 1933.226 
average 2028.987 1869.711 1974.596 2090.738 2847.318 1958.758 1827.992 1957.78 
variance 94.39082 457.8927 231.9657 256.4114 352.23 73.78972 178.8189 603.9721 
 14 15 23 24 25 34 35 45 
1 2563.333 1801.631 2052.024 2721.655 1910.381 2895.905 2031.631 2762.155 
2 2583.179 1812.119 2033.81 2768.464 1908.976 2870.238 2012.738 2750.619 
3 2586.536 1801.536 2054.238 2804.024 1899.726 2871.464 2022.298 2727.881 
4 2558.738 1801.274 2066.619 2763.024 1892.143 2920.083 2006.786 2769.94 
5 2599.917 1812.298 2047.405 2750.607 1909.857 2913.071 2050 2734.071 
6 2604.155 1823.893 2059.964 2719.976 1895.548 2888.512 2035.667 2742.464 
7 2580.583 1831.214 2043.274 2753.536 1912.595 2878.512 2012.845 2710.667 
8 2636.667 1805.048 2039.036 2730.048 1930.262 2936.548 2043.81 2747.69 
9 2627.536 1793.833 2013.452 2803.321 1901.595 2926.202 2011.583 2730.5 
10 2588.798 1824.155 2065.56 2763.048 1912.071 2878.56 2024.881 2781.774 
average 2592.944 1810.7 2047.538 2757.77 1907.315 2897.91 2025.224 2745.776 
variance 626.2001 150.2225 261.0087 883.8466 117.1842 591.448 217.0246 456.5963 
 123 124 125 134 135 145 234 235 
1 1949.476 2528.988 1742.857 2673.833 1890.202 2494.25 2882.94 1981.857 
2 1899.821 2487.131 1762.262 2675.893 1883.417 2509.845 2851.071 1974.762 
3 1919.631 2524.762 1741.905 2677.071 1894.667 2499.06 2838.702 2001.607 
4 1918.893 2520.524 1753.036 2628.488 1878.048 2503.893 2833.619 1964.036 
5 1930.095 2515.44 1767.107 2621.845 1888.44 2462.881 2816.048 1980.369 
6 1907.893 2514.417 1732.036 2676.202 1912.476 2521.798 2802.667 1963.012 
7 1942.524 2487.452 1753.464 2651.262 1877.643 2526.226 2826.524 1967.25 
8 1913.071 2525.738 1774.81 2655 1904.917 2549.321 2821.476 1976.369 
9 1916.274 2528.976 1769.476 2641.798 1888.131 2508.083 2839.131 1966.821 
10 1931.917 2539.548 1778.214 2651.44 1892.679 2491.595 2839.702 1981.988 
average 1922.96 2517.298 1757.517 2655.283 1891.062 2506.695 2835.188 1975.807 
variance 238.8344 301.9999 236.5969 414.462 121.1364 534.1249 474.4883 135.4354 
 245 345 1234 1235 1245 1345 2345 12345 
1 2671.964 2806.405 2602.595 1867.238 2375.429 2568.667 2692.762 2494.202 
2 2619.94 2813.702 2632.488 1836.905 2406.631 2576.214 2744.036 2561.429 
3 2635.381 2818.821 2634.643 1850.524 2385.583 2565.976 2714.417 2499.917 
4 2630.167 2797.083 2621.548 1835.345 2392.762 2532.417 2678.06 2523.679 
5 2659.488 2804.262 2642.393 1845.571 2421.31 2589.81 2721.821 2540.179 
6 2669.107 2778.143 2592.345 1829.107 2420.333 2601.702 2729.643 2488.988 
7 2640.107 2821.19 2579.702 1838.595 2405.857 2574.81 2742.417 2488.964 
8 2650.321 2801.536 2637.452 1880.31 2409.131 2585.571 2729.369 2495.917 
9 2612.476 2820.25 2618.286 1860.226 2446.143 2563.107 2723.071 2558.607 
10 2627.333 2791.56 2610.167 1860.333 2444.167 2573.857 2712.25 2497.595 
average 2641.629 2805.295 2617.162 1850.415 2410.735 2573.213 2718.785 2514.948 
variance 418.5741 193.3035 432.1646 266.4622 535.637 343.4779 427.9019 827.5634 
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             Table C.6. ANOVA results for ratio of illegal infiltrations caught 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter
Observed 
Power 
Corrected 
Model .439 31 1.417E-02 336.233 .000 .973 10423.222 1.000 
Intercept 105.361 1 105.361 2500125.165 .000 1.000 
2500125.16
5 1.000 
         A 4.880E-02 1 4.880E-02 1157.877 .000 .801 1157.877 1.000 
         B 1.765E-02 1 1.765E-02 418.839 .000 .593 418.839 1.000 
C 1.430E-03 1 1.430E-03 33.926 .000 .105 33.926 .999 
D .367 1 .367 8707.032 .000 .968 8707.032 1.000 
E 1.050E-03 1 1.050E-03 24.920 .000 .080 24.920 .992 
A * B 7.679E-05 1 7.679E-05 1.822 .178 .006 1.822 .109 
A * C 1.563E-04 1 1.563E-04 3.708 .055 .013 3.708 .254 
B * C 3.639E-06 1 3.639E-06 .086 .769 .000 .086 .013 
A * B * C 2.594E-05 1 2.594E-05 .616 .433 .002 .616 .037 
      A * D 6.785E-04 1 6.785E-04 16.100 .000 .053 16.100 .921 
B * D 6.218E-04 1 6.218E-04 14.754 .000 .049 14.754 .893 
A * B * D 1.621E-05 1 1.621E-05 .385 .536 .001 .385 .026 
C * D 6.923E-05 1 6.923E-05 1.643 .201 .006 1.643 .097 
A * C * D 1.353E-04 1 1.353E-04 3.211 .074 .011 3.211 .214 
B * C * D 8.871E-06 1 8.871E-06 .210 .647 .001 .210 .018 
A * B * C * 
D 1.988E-04 1 1.988E-04 4.717 .031 .016 4.717 .338 
A * E 1.546E-06 1 1.546E-06 .037 .848 .000 .037 .011 
B * E 4.381E-05 1 4.381E-05 1.040 .309 .004 1.040 .059 
A * B * E 5.772E-06 1 5.772E-06 .137 .712 .000 .137 .015 
C * E 6.109E-06 1 6.109E-06 .145 .704 .001 .145 .016 
A * C * E 6.650E-05 1 6.650E-05 1.578 .210 .005 1.578 .092 
B * C * E 1.210E-04 1 1.210E-04 2.871 .091 .010 2.871 .186 
A * B * C * 
E 3.528E-05 1 3.528E-05 .837 .361 .003 .837 .048 
       D * E 2.880E-04 1 2.880E-04 6.833 .009 .023 6.833 .509 
A * D * E 4.572E-05 1 4.572E-05 1.085 .298 .004 1.085 .062 
B * D * E 1.016E-04 1 1.016E-04 2.412 .122 .008 2.412 .151 
A * B * D * 
E 5.471E-04 1 5.471E-04 12.982 .000 .043 12.982 .843 
C * D * E 5.550E-05 1 5.550E-05 1.317 .252 .005 1.317 .076 
A * C * D * 
E 1.335E-05 1 1.335E-05 .317 .574 .001 .317 .023 
B * C * D * 
E 5.541E-05 1 5.541E-05 1.315 .252 .005 1.315 .076 
A * B * C * 
D * E 1.983E-05 1 1.983E-05 .471 .493 .002 .471 .030 
Error 1.214E-02 288 4.214E-05      
Total 105.812 320       
Corrected 
Total .451 319       
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         Table C.7. ANOVA results for degree of controllability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter
Observed 
Power 
Corrected 
Model .346 31 1.117E-02 697.354 .000 .987 21617.985 1.000 
Intercept 18.835 1 18.835 1176183.286 .000 1.000 
1176183.28
6 1.000 
A .290 1 .290 18131.369 .000 .984 18131.369 1.000 
B 3.910E-02 1 3.910E-02 2441.905 .000 .895 2441.905 1.000 
C 1.125E-03 1 1.125E-03 70.275 .000 .196 70.275 1.000 
D 1.585E-04 1 1.585E-04 9.898 .002 .033 9.898 .710 
E 1.468E-02 1 1.468E-02 916.734 .000 .761 916.734 1.000 
A * B 2.400E-04 1 2.400E-04 14.988 .000 .049 14.988 .899 
A * C 5.145E-06 1 5.145E-06 .321 .571 .001 .321 .023 
B * C 3.534E-05 1 3.534E-05 2.207 .139 .008 2.207 .136 
A * B * C 7.007E-05 1 7.007E-05 4.375 .037 .015 4.375 .310 
A * D 4.523E-08 1 4.523E-08 .003 .958 .000 .003 .010 
B * D 3.355E-07 1 3.355E-07 .021 .885 .000 .021 .011 
A * B * D 5.940E-07 1 5.940E-07 .037 .847 .000 .037 .011 
C * D 1.326E-05 1 1.326E-05 .828 .364 .003 .828 .048 
A * C * D 5.412E-07 1 5.412E-07 .034 .854 .000 .034 .011 
B * C * D 7.107E-06 1 7.107E-06 .444 .506 .002 .444 .028 
A * B * C * 
D 9.507E-06 1 9.507E-06 .594 .442 .002 .594 .036 
A * E 1.517E-04 1 1.517E-04 9.472 .002 .032 9.472 .686 
B * E 4.056E-05 1 4.056E-05 2.533 .113 .009 2.533 .160 
A * B * E 8.722E-06 1 8.722E-06 .545 .461 .002 .545 .033 
C * E 4.418E-05 1 4.418E-05 2.759 .098 .009 2.759 .178 
A * C * E 6.787E-07 1 6.787E-07 .042 .837 .000 .042 .012 
B * C * E 1.031E-05 1 1.031E-05 .644 .423 .002 .644 .038 
A * B * C * 
E 1.323E-06 1 1.323E-06 .083 .774 .000 .083 .013 
D * E 5.459E-06 1 5.459E-06 .341 .560 .001 .341 .024 
A * D * E 2.399E-05 1 2.399E-05 1.498 .222 .005 1.498 .087 
B * D * E 5.959E-05 1 5.959E-05 3.721 .055 .013 3.721 .255 
A * B * D * 
E 6.277E-06 1 6.277E-06 .392 .532 .001 .392 .026 
C * D * E 1.113E-05 1 1.113E-05 .695 .405 .002 .695 .041 
A * C * D * 
E 2.394E-07 1 2.394E-07 .015 .903 .000 .015 .011 
B * C * D * 
E 1.705E-05 1 1.705E-05 1.064 .303 .004 1.064 .061 
A * B * C * 
D * E 2.390E-06 1 2.390E-06 .149 .700 .001 .149 .016 
Error 4.612E-03 288 1.601E-05      
Total 19.186 320       
Corrected 
Total .351 319       
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       Table C.8. ANOVA results for frequency of controlling 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power 
Corrected 
Model 
47431035.8
45 31 
1530033.41
4 4274.148 .000 .998 132498.580 1.000 
Intercept 1689813508.866 1 
168981350
8.866 
4720493.35
7 .000 1.000 
4720493.35
7 1.000 
A 2779263.955 1 
2779263.95
5 7763.873 .000 .964 7763.873 1.000 
B 299966.062 1 299966.062 837.955 .000 .744 837.955 1.000 
C 467848.559 1 467848.559 1306.935 .000 .819 1306.935 1.000 
D 43077344.631 1 
43077344.6
31 120336.545 .000 .998 120336.545 1.000 
E 567255.403 1 567255.403 1584.628 .000 .846 1584.628 1.000 
A * B 3316.232 1 3316.232 9.264 .003 .031 9.264 .674 
A * C 7497.898 1 7497.898 20.945 .000 .068 20.945 .976 
B * C 7251.928 1 7251.928 20.258 .000 .066 20.258 .971 
A * B * C 427.262 1 427.262 1.194 .276 .004 1.194 .068 
A * D 171386.082 1 171386.082 478.767 .000 .624 478.767 1.000 
B * D 18316.739 1 18316.739 51.168 .000 .151 51.168 1.000 
A * B * D 685.983 1 685.983 1.916 .167 .007 1.916 .115 
C * D 250.784 1 250.784 .701 .403 .002 .701 .041 
A * C * D 105.773 1 105.773 .295 .587 .001 .295 .022 
B * C * D 2366.996 1 2366.996 6.612 .011 .022 6.612 .492 
A * B * C * 
D 188.162 1 188.162 .526 .469 .002 .526 .032 
A * E 966.464 1 966.464 2.700 .101 .009 2.700 .173 
B * E 3088.056 1 3088.056 8.626 .004 .029 8.626 .635 
A * B * E 80.907 1 80.907 .226 .635 .001 .226 .019 
C * E 18.437 1 18.437 .052 .821 .000 .052 .012 
A * C * E 32.376 1 32.376 .090 .764 .000 .090 .013 
B * C * E 49.182 1 49.182 .137 .711 .000 .137 .015 
A * B * C * 
E 182.437 1 182.437 .510 .476 .002 .510 .032 
D * E 21173.003 1 21173.003 59.147 .000 .170 59.147 1.000 
A * D * E 593.985 1 593.985 1.659 .199 .006 1.659 .098 
B * D * E 1061.719 1 1061.719 2.966 .086 .010 2.966 .194 
A * B * D * 
E 44.644 1 44.644 .125 .724 .000 .125 .015 
C * D * E 222.858 1 222.858 .623 .431 .002 .623 .037 
A * C * D * 
E 30.643 1 30.643 .086 .770 .000 .086 .013 
B * C * D * 
E 9.429 1 9.429 .026 .871 .000 .026 .011 
A * B * C * 
D * E 9.258 1 9.258 .026 .872 .000 .026 .011 
Error 103096.489 288 357.974      
Total 1737347641.200 320       
Corrected 
Total 
47534132.3
34 319       
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Table C.9. ANOVA results when factor d is with its low value 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Eta Squared
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power 
Corrected 
Model 1306230.533 15 87082.036 382.658 .000 .976 5739.865 1.000 
Intercept 596644242.756 1 
596644242.7
56 2621786.150 .000 1.000 2621786.150 1.000 
A 785160.429 1 785160.429 3450.168 .000 .960 3450.168 1.000 
B 85017.181 1 85017.181 373.584 .000 .722 373.584 1.000 
C 244881.514 1 244881.514 1076.063 .000 .882 1076.063 1.000 
E 184621.774 1 184621.774 811.269 .000 .849 811.269 1.000 
A * B 492.837 1 492.837 2.166 .143 .015 2.166 .131 
A * C 4692.381 1 4692.381 20.619 .000 .125 20.619 .972 
B * C 666.361 1 666.361 2.928 .089 .020 2.928 .188 
A * B * C 24.173 1 24.173 .106 .745 .001 .106 .014 
A * E 22.554 1 22.554 .099 .753 .001 .099 .014 
B * E 264.184 1 264.184 1.161 .283 .008 1.161 .066 
A * B * E 122.875 1 122.875 .540 .464 .004 .540 .033 
C * E 56.548 1 56.548 .248 .619 .002 .248 .020 
A * C * E 63.007 1 63.007 .277 .600 .002 .277 .021 
B * C * E 7.771 1 7.771 .034 .854 .000 .034 .011 
A * B * C * E 136.944 1 136.944 .602 .439 .004 .602 .036 
Error 32770.320 144 227.572      
Total 597983243.609 160       
Corrected 
Total 1339000.853 159       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.10. ANOVA results when factor d is with its high value 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Eta Squared
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power 
Corrected 
Model 3047460.681 15 203164.045 415.999 .000 .977 6239.986 1.000 
Intercept 1136246610.741 1 
1136246610.
741 2326580.768 .000 1.000 2326580.768 1.000 
A 2165489.608 1 2165489.608 4434.061 .000 .969 4434.061 1.000 
B 233265.620 1 233265.620 477.635 .000 .768 477.635 1.000 
C 223217.829 1 223217.829 457.061 .000 .760 457.061 1.000 
E 403806.633 1 403806.633 826.835 .000 .852 826.835 1.000 
A * B 3509.378 1 3509.378 7.186 .008 .048 7.186 .529 
A * C 2911.289 1 2911.289 5.961 .016 .040 5.961 .436 
B * C 8952.563 1 8952.563 18.331 .000 .113 18.331 .951 
A * B * C 591.251 1 591.251 1.211 .273 .008 1.211 .068 
A * E 1537.895 1 1537.895 3.149 .078 .021 3.149 .206 
B * E 3885.592 1 3885.592 7.956 .005 .052 7.956 .584 
A * B * E 2.676 1 2.676 .005 .941 .000 .005 .010 
C * E 184.746 1 184.746 .378 .539 .003 .378 .025 
A * C * E 1.192E-02 1 1.192E-02 .000 .996 .000 .000 .010 
B * C * E 50.840 1 50.840 .104 .747 .001 .104 .014 
A * B * C * E 54.750 1 54.750 .112 .738 .001 .112 .014 
Error 70326.169 144 488.376      
Total 1139364397.591 160       
Corrected 
Total 3117786.850 159       
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Table C.11. Analysis of normal P-P plot effects of performance measures 
ratio of illegal ınfıltratıons caught degree of controllability order(j) 
Effect Estimate Effect Effect Estimate Effect 
(j-0.5)/32 
31 0.067725 4 0.060245 1 0.953125 
30 0.024697 1 0.022109 2 0.921875 
29 0.014854 2 0.013546 5 0.890625 
28 0.004227 3 0.001408 4 0.859375 
27 0.003623 5 0.000863 245 0.828125 
26 0.002615 1245 0.000712 25 0.796875 
25 0.001576 1234 0.000462 2345 0.765625 
24 0.001398 13 0.000373 345 0.734375 
23 0.00123 235 0.000359 235 0.703125 
22 0.001127 245 0.000345 1234 0.671875 
21 0.00093 34 0.00033 125 0.640625 
20 0.000833 345 0.00028 1245 0.609375 
19 0.000269 125 0.000261 45 0.578125 
18 0.000139 15 0.000129 1235 0.546875 
17 -0.00021 23 9.21E-05 135 0.515625 
16 -0.00028 35 8.22E-05 134 0.484375 
15 -0.00033 234 2.38E-05 14 0.453125 
14 -0.00041 1345 -5.47E-05 1345 0.421875 
13 -0.00045 124 -6.48E-05 24 0.390625 
12 -0.0005 12345 -8.62E-05 124 0.359375 
11 -0.00057 123 -0.00017 12345 0.328125 
10 -0.00066 1235 -0.00025 13 0.296875 
9 -0.00074 25 -0.0003 234 0.265625 
8 -0.00076 145 -0.00041 34 0.234375 
7 -0.00083 2345 -0.00055 145 0.203125 
6 -0.00091 135 -0.00066 23 0.171875 
5 -0.00098 12 -0.00074 35 0.140625 
4 -0.0013 134 -0.00094 123 0.109375 
3 -0.0019 45 -0.00138 15 0.078125 
2 -0.00279 24 -0.00173 12 0.046875 
1 -0.00291 14 -0.00375 3 0.015625 
Frequency of controlling when motorized 
patrol has low level 
Frequency of controlling when motorized 
patrol has high level order(j) 
Effect Estimate Effect Effect Estimate Effect 
(j-0.5)/16 
15 78.24345 3 74.70238 3 0.90625 
14 10.83095 13 14.96042 23 0.84375 
13 4.081547 23 9.366667 12 0.78125 
12 3.510119 12 8.53125 13 0.71875 
11 1.850298 1234 6.200595 14 0.65625 
10 0.777381 123 3.844643 123 0.59375 
9 0.750893 14 2.149107 34 0.53125 
8 -0.44077 234 1.16994 1234 0.46875 
7 -1.18899 34 -0.01726 134 0.40625 
6 -1.25506 134 -0.25863 124 0.34375 
5 -1.75268 124 -1.12738 234 0.28125 
4 -2.56994 24 -9.85595 24 0.21875 
3 -46.1024 2 -76.3652 2 0.15625 
2 -67.9378 4 -100.475 4 0.09375 
1 -140.104 1 -232.674 1 0.03125 
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 a) Normal probability plot of ratio of illegal infiltrations caught 
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 b) Normal probability plot of degree of controllability 
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c) Normal probability plot of                             d) Normal probability plot of  
    frequency of controlling                                       frequency of controlling 
     (factor d low)                                                       (factor d high) 
 
  
Figure C.1. Normal probability plots of each performance measure
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Assumptions of ANOVA 
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Figure D.1 Scatter plot of variances 
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Table D.1. Residual analysis for performance measures 
 
 
Ratio of illegal infiltrations caught Degree of controllability  
y y^ e=y-y^ y y^ e=y-y^ 
1 0.534113 0.538746 -0.00463 0.255909 0.258323 -0.00241 
2 0.532051 0.528783 0.003268 0.216964 0.217427 -0.00046 
3 0.515564 0.517981 -0.00242 0.191199 0.189838 0.001361 
4 0.58446 0.586464 -0.002 0.195038 0.194996 4.2E-05 
5 0.521377 0.516662 0.004715 0.209436 0.209894 -0.00046 
12 0.55936 0.559005 0.000356 0.278384 0.278702 -0.00032 
13 0.545642 0.542973 0.00267 0.255045 0.254573 0.000472 
14 0.611927 0.610866 0.001061 0.259322 0.259731 -0.00041 
15 0.54825 0.546884 0.001366 0.269634 0.269109 0.000525 
23 0.533293 0.53301 0.000284 0.216538 0.213677 0.002861 
24 0.603565 0.601143 0.002423 0.219172 0.218835 0.000337 
25 0.535533 0.536921 -0.00139 0.232545 0.233733 -0.00119 
34 0.590756 0.590691 6.6E-05 0.192695 0.191246 0.001449 
35 0.516876 0.520889 -0.00401 0.204656 0.206144 -0.00149 
45 0.588982 0.590802 -0.00182 0.211078 0.211302 -0.00022 
123 0.563046 0.563232 -0.00019 0.273828 0.274952 -0.00112 
124 0.618067 0.620315 -0.00225 0.279693 0.28011 -0.00042 
125 0.561278 0.561913 -0.00063 0.291509 0.289488 0.002021 
134 0.61672 0.615093 0.001628 0.257656 0.255981 0.001675 
135 0.552763 0.551111 0.001653 0.266433 0.265359 0.001074 
145 0.609764 0.609974 -0.00021 0.270129 0.270517 -0.00039 
234 0.603636 0.60537 -0.00173 0.214357 0.215085 -0.00073 
235 0.54002 0.541148 -0.00113 0.228784 0.229983 -0.0012 
245 0.599975 0.600251 -0.00028 0.235412 0.235141 0.000271 
345 0.595913 0.595029 0.000885 0.206191 0.207552 -0.00136 
1234 0.625311 0.624542 0.000769 0.273366 0.27636 -0.00299 
1235 0.565531 0.56614 -0.00061 0.285412 0.285738 -0.00033 
1245 0.623975 0.624653 -0.00068 0.293317 0.290896 0.002421 
1345 0.614559 0.614201 0.000359 0.266244 0.266767 -0.00052 
2345 0.606919 0.604478 0.002441 0.231511 0.231391 0.00012 
12345 0.628162 0.62888 -0.00072 0.287878 0.287146 0.000732 
Frequency of controlling (patrol type with low level) Frequency of controlling (patrol type with high level)  
y y^ e=y-y^ y y^ e=y-y^ 
1 1869.711 1873.085 -3.37429 2592.944 2596.875 -3.93095 
2 1974.596 1977.915 -3.31857 2757.77 2737.915 19.85524 
3 2090.738 2091.085 -0.3469 2897.91 2907.125 -9.21548 
4 1958.758 1956.915 1.843333 2745.776 2748.085 -2.30881 
12 1827.992 1827.085 0.906667 2517.298 2515.275 2.022619 
13 1957.78 1961.915 -4.13524 2655.283 2665.765 -10.4817 
14 1810.7 1806.085 4.615 2506.695 2506.725 -0.02976 
23 2047.538 2045.085 2.453095 2835.188 2836.725 -1.53691 
24 1907.315 1910.915 -3.59952 2641.629 2647.765 -6.13643 
34 2025.224 2024.085 1.13881 2805.295 2797.275 8.020238 
123 1922.96 1915.915 7.044524 2617.162 2614.085 3.076905 
124 1757.517 1760.085 -2.56833 2410.735 2425.125 -14.3905 
134 1891.062 1894.915 -3.85309 2573.213 2555.915 17.2981 
234 1975.807 1978.085 -2.27786 2718.785 2726.875 -8.09048 
1234 1850.415 1848.915 1.500476 2514.948 2504.235 10.71262 
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    a) Scatter plot of residuals for ratio of illegal infiltrations caught. 
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  b) Scatter plot of residuals for degree of controllability 
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  c) Scatter plot of residuals for FOC                          d) Scatter plot of residuals for (FOC) 
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Figure D.4. Scatter plot of residuals 
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APPENDIX  E 
 
 
Results of Alternatives and Pairwise Comparisons of Alternatives   
 
Table E.1. Results of 10 replications for ratio of illegal infiltrations caught 
 
 
Table E.2. Results of 10 replications for degree of controllability 
 
 
Table E.3. Results of 10 replications for frequency of controlling 
 
 
 
 
 
 Alternative1 Alternative2 Alternative3 Alternative4 Alternative5 Alternative6 
1 0.512616 0.647059 0.565512 0.537676 0.636602 0.573177 
2 0.537588 0.64261 0.560351 0.534868 0.63969 0.56649 
3 0.537792 0.646491 0.565972 0.54666 0.626952 0.564944 
4 0.519941 0.625775 0.561998 0.539209 0.63365 0.566028 
5 0.540292 0.636319 0.560534 0.529421 0.639105 0.567309 
6 0.534402 0.614714 0.570262 0.531103 0.640259 0.577602 
7 0.529684 0.62064 0.558047 0.532788 0.640599 0.572894 
8 0.524113 0.636022 0.546502 0.528124 0.631964 0.573784 
9 0.538462 0.623279 0.555462 0.544608 0.631964 0.577882 
10 0.532653 0.625471 0.563234 0.542829 0.628264 0.576108 
Average 0.530754 0.631838 0.560787 0.536729 0.634905 0.571622 
Variance 7.55E-05 1.17E-04 3.87E-05 3.83E-05 2.31E-05 2.25E-05 
Rinott Ni 6.70 8.35 4.80 4.78 3.71 3.66 
 Alternative1 Alternative2 Alternative3 Alternative4 Alternative5 Alternative6 
1 0.22264 0.217991 0.290523 0.21905 0.22761 0.291102 
2 0.219036 0.216447 0.274816 0.229664 0.224461 0.296353 
3 0.223063 0.222325 0.284535 0.222797 0.222789 0.290295 
4 0.217875 0.216381 0.296514 0.223085 0.22363 0.289109 
5 0.221235 0.220999 0.286403 0.226565 0.233248 0.294565 
6 0.218774 0.22625 0.280381 0.226967 0.223173 0.296159 
7 0.219083 0.22495 0.283159 0.218191 0.227942 0.294094 
8 0.225416 0.226096 0.287931 0.220596 0.233121 0.29458 
9 0.218195 0.217992 0.28916 0.223861 0.222776 0.284302 
10 0.210782 0.22882 0.271615 0.228232 0.221468 0.295075 
Average 0.21961 0.221825 0.284504 0.223901 0.226022 0.292563 
Variance 1.57E-05 2.06E-05 5.51E-05 1.53E-05 1.85E-05 1.46E-05 
Rinott Ni 3.06 3.50 5.73 3.02 3.32 2.95 
 Alternative1 Alternative2 Alternative3 Alternative4 Alternative5 Alternative6 
1 2045.583 3182.143 1861.524 2049.226 3154.821 1866.202 
2 2038.583 3171.393 1897.238 2033.94 3145.833 1857.821 
3 2034.048 3146.143 1877.929 2041.5 3164.202 1857.06 
4 2037.25 3165.321 1853.571 2060.786 3152.583 1869.131 
5 2054.333 3149.607 1883.345 2038.202 3133.31 1873.929 
6 2046.536 3123.012 1889.452 2021.381 3154.833 1854.643 
7 2045.75 3141.262 1884.595 2055.012 3152.083 1881.31 
8 2030.798 3145.726 1875.202 2062.798 3099.179 1861.964 
9 2034.048 3166.536 1855.821 2058.988 3164.881 1886.595 
10 2099.476 3144.429 1900.143 2035.845 3142.56 1848.476 
Average 2046.64 3153.557 1877.882 2045.768 3146.429 1865.713 
Variance 397.1077 304.6123 270.1598 188.4726 365.2591 147.7339 
Rinott Ni 7.69 6.73 6.34 5.29 7.37 4.69 
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Table E.4. Paired samples test of alternatives for degree of controllability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paired Differences 
 
 
 
 
99% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 
Lower Upper 
t 
 
 
df 
 
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
 
Pair 1 ALT1 - ALT2 -2.21E-03 6.65E-03 2.10E-03 -9.05E-03 4.62E-03 -1.053 9 .320 
Pair 2 ALT1 - ALT3 -6.48E-02 6.35E-03 2.00E-03 -7.14E-02 -5.83E-02 -32.305 9 .000 
Pair 3 ALT1 - ALT4 -4.29E-03 6.87E-03 2.17E-03 -1.13E-02 2.77E-03 -1.974 9 .080 
Pair 4 ALT1 - ALT5 -6.41E-03 3.54E-03 1.11E-03 -1.00E-02 -2.77E-03 -5.725 9 .000 
Pair 5 ALT1 - ALT6 -7.29E-02 5.66E-03 1.79E-03 -7.87E-02 -6.71E-02 -40.730 9 .000 
Pair 6 ALT2 - ALT3 -6.26E-02 1.04E-02 3.31E-03 -7.34E-02 -5.19E-02 -18.907 9 .000 
Pair 7 ALT2 - ALT4 -2.07E-03 5.96E-03 1.88E-03 -8.20E-03 4.05E-03 -1.101 9 .300 
Pair 8 ALT2 - ALT5 -4.19E-03 6.03E-03 1.90E-03 -1.04E-02 2.00E-03 -2.198 9 .056 
Pair 9 ALT2 - ALT6 -7.07E-02 4.18E-03 1.32E-03 -7.50E-02 -6.64E-02 -53.505 9 .000 
Pair 10 ALT3 - ALT4 6.06E-02 1.03E-02 3.26E-03 5.00E-02 7.12E-02 18.576 9 .000 
Pair 11 ALT3 - ALT5 5.84E-02 7.37E-03 2.33E-03 5.09E-02 6.60E-02 25.069 9 .000 
Pair 12 ALT3 - ALT6 -8.05E-03 1.03E-02 3.25E-03 -1.86E-02 2.53E-03 -2.473 9 .035 
Pair 13 ALT4 - ALT5 -2.12E-03 6.77E-03 2.14E-03 -9.08E-03 4.84E-03 -.989 9 .348 
Pair 14 ALT4 - ALT6 -6.86E-02 4.42E-03 1.39E-03 -7.32E-02 -6.41E-02 -49.092 9 .000 
Pair 15 ALT5 - ALT6 -6.65E-02 4.82E-03 1.52E-03 -7.15E-02 -6.15E-02 -43.576 9 .000 
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Table E.5. Paired samples test of alternatives for frequency of controlling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        Paired Differences 
 
 
 
 
99% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 Lower Upper 
t 
 
 
df 
 
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
 
Pair 1 ALT1 - ALT2 -1106.91 29.38894 9.29359 -1137.11 -1076.71 -119.105 9 .000 
Pair 2 ALT1 - ALT3 168.758 17.52711 5.54256 150.7459 186.7707 30.448 9 .000 
Pair 3 ALT1 - ALT4 .872619 28.50020 9.01255 -28.41671 30.16194 .097 9 .925 
Pair 4 ALT1 - ALT5 -1099.78 27.9340 8.83352 -1128.495 -1071.08 -124.502 9 .000 
Pair 5 ALT1 - ALT6 180.9273 27.3888 8.66111 152.7801 209.0745 20.890 9 .000 
Pair 6 ALT2 - ALT3 1275.674 29.5194 9.33485 1245.338 1306.011 136.657 9 .000 
Pair 7 ALT2 - ALT4 1107.78 17.2093 5.44207 1090.103 1125.47 203.560 9 .000 
Pair 8 ALT2 - ALT5 7.128571 23.4478 7.41486 -16.9685 31.2256 .961 9 .361 
Pair 9 ALT2 - ALT6 1287.844 18.1738 5.74707 1269.166 1306.521 224.087 9 .000 
Pair 10 ALT3 - ALT4 -167.885 28.0247 8.86221 -196.686 -139.084 -18.944 9 .000 
Pair 11 ALT3 - ALT5 -1268.54 27.7290 8.76869 -1297.04 -1240.049 -144.668 9 .000 
Pair 12 ALT3 - ALT6 12.1690 25.5499 8.07961 -14.08836 38.42646 1.506 9 .166 
Pair 13 ALT4 - ALT5 -1100.66 25.8839 8.18523 -1127.26 -1074.060 -134.469 9 .000 
Pair 14 ALT4 - ALT6 180.0547 11.4928 3.63436 168.243 191.865 49.542 9 .000 
Pair 15 ALT5 - ALT6 1280.715 20.63393 6.52502 1259.510 1301.920 196.278 9 .000 
 126
 
 
 
Table E.6a. Pairwise comparison matrix of alternatives for ratio of illegal infiltrations caught  
 criterion 
 
 
 
Table E.6b.  Pairwise comparison matrix of alternatives for degree of controllability criterion 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E.6c.  Pairwise comparison matrix of alternatives for frequency of controlling criterion 
 
 
 
 
Table E.6d.  Pairwise comparison matrix of alternatives for cost criterion 
 
 
alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.0000 0.2049 0.4651 0.8130 0.2000 0.3890 
2 4.8804 1.0000 3.7223 4.6413 0.8938 3.3050 
3 2.1501 0.2687 1.0000 1.9189 0.2603 0.7055 
4 1.2300 0.2155 0.5211 1.0000 0.2096 0.4273 
5 5.0000 1.1188 3.8417 4.7710 1.0000 3.0370 
6 2.5707 0.3026 1.4174 2.3403 0.3293 1.0000 
alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.0000 0.8922 0.2192 0.8091 0.7401 0.2000 
2 1.1208 1.0000 0.2252 0.8966 0.8127 0.2049 
3 4.5620 4.4405 1.0000 4.3251 4.2098 0.6949 
4 1.2359 1.1153 0.2312 1.0000 0.8966 0.2099 
5 1.3512 1.2305 0.2375 1.1153 1.0000 0.2151 
6 5.0000 4.8804 1.4391 4.7642 4.6490 1.0000 
alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.0000 0.2253 1.5248 1.0000 0.2264 1.5621 
2 4.4385 1.0000 4.9627 4.4409 1.0000 5.0000 
3 0.6558 0.2015 1.0000 0.6571 0.2023 1.0000 
4 1.0000 0.2252 1.5218 1.0000 0.2262 1.5590 
5 4.4170 1.0000 4.9432 4.4209 1.0000 4.9782 
6 0.6402 0.2000 1.0000 0.6414 0.2009 1.0000 
alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.0000 2.6600 5.0000 1.0000 2.6600 5.0000 
2 0.3759 1.0000 3.3300 0.3750 1.0000 3.3300 
3 0.2000 0.3003 1.0000 0.2000 0.3000 1.0000 
4 1.0000 2.6667 5.0000 1.0000 2.6600 5.0000 
5 0.3759 1.0000 3.3333 0.3759 1.0000 3.3300 
6 0.2000 0.3003 1.0000 0.2000 0.3003 1.0000 
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Computer Code of Border Security System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 128
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 129
APPENDIX    G 
 
 
Input Data 
 
 
We define the input data we use in our model.  
Arrival process of illegal infiltrations is best defined by Poisson process. Because; (1) 
illegal infiltrations arrive one at a time for each zone, (2) N(t+s)-N(t) (the number of arrivals 
in the time interval (t,t+s) is independent of {N(u), 0<=u<=t}, (3) the distribution of N(t+s)-
N(t) is independent of t for all t,s>=0. We know that Poisson process is an arrival process for 
which the interarrival times between arrivals are identically independent distributed 
exponential random variables. We decide the parameters of the exponential distribution as 
seen in Table G.1 according to number of illegal infiltrations that is probable in one year of 
time period by asking military experts. We also determine the parameters of discrete 
distribution for type of illegal infiltrations and parameters of triangular distribution for 
infiltration time of each type of infiltration by consulting specialists as seen in Table G.2-G.3. 
Table G.1. Arrivals of illegal infiltrations 
illegal infiltrations for critical 
zones exponential(2500) 
Illegal infiltrations for uncritical 
zones exponential(7000) 
 
Table G.2. Type of illegal infiltrations 
refugees terrorists smugglers 
enemy 
special 
forces 
enemy 
troops 
35% 30% 25% 5% 5% 
 
Table G.3. Infiltration time of illegal infiltrations 
 
refugees terrorists smugglers enemy special forces enemy troops 
infiltration 
time tria(60,75,90) tria(20,25,30) tria(40,50,60) tria(10,15,20) tria(30,40,50) 
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We decide parameters of triangular distribution for duty time of patrols (according to 
motorized or on-foot) and duty time of other security elements (according to stationary or 
moving) as seen in Table G.4-G.5, by using information given in border services instructions 
(KKY 118-1). Duty time when failure occurs is determined according to duty time of 
elements as seen in Table G.6. 
Table G.4. Duty time of patrols 
 motorized on-foot 
1st patrol triangular(4,5,6) triangular(8,10,12) 1st platoon 2nd patrol triangular(3,4,5) triangular(6.5,7.5,8.5) 
2nd platoon patrol triangular(4,5,6) triangular(8,10,12) 
3rd platoon patrol triangular(4,5,6) triangular(8,10,12) 
1st patrol triangular(2,3,4) triangular(4.5,6,7.5) 4th platoon 2nd patrol triangular(4,5,6) triangular(8,9,10) 
 
 
Table G.5. Duty time of ambushes, thermal camera and askarad 
 
Table G.6. Duty time when failure happened 
 stationary duty mobile duty 
thermal camera uniform(0,600) uniform(0,160) 
askarad uniform(0,600) uniform(0,200) 
 
 
We decide the parameters of discrete distribution for weather conditions and failures 
before duty as seen in Table G.7-G.8, by using established statistics gained by experiences 
and asking military experts. 
Table G.7 Weather conditions               Table G.8 Failure conditions                                   
    Failure before duty 
No failure 
before duty 
Askarad 
Thermal camera
Night-vision 
tool 
Vehicle for 
patrol 
10% 90% 
 
 
 
 
 stationary duty mobile duty 
ambushes triangular(600,630,660) triangular(120,150,180) 
thermal camera triangular(600,630,660) triangular(160,200,240) 
askarad triangular(600,630,660) triangular(160,200,240) 
Bad weather 
conditions 
appropriate 
weather 
conditions for 
duty 
0.05 0.95 
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The parameters of discrete distribution presented in Tables G.9-G.12 are controllable 
parameters of the model. By using statistics gained by experiences and consulting to specialists, 
we decide the parameters of these random variables (stationary or mobile characteristics of duty, 
type of patrols, degree of use of night-vision tools by ambushes, degree of use of technologic 
devices).  
Table G.9. Stationary or mobile characteristics   Table G.10. Type of patrols 
                  of duty 
 
Table G.11. Degree of use of night-vision tools      Table G.12. Degree of use of technologic              
 by ambushes devices 
 
 with night-vision device 
without night-
vision device
ambushes 0.25 0.75 
 
 
 
 
The parameters of discrete distribution presented in Table G.13-G.18 are determined 
by using information about operational behavior of border security system and consulting to 
experts. Because, events in the system, such as selection of duty places for each security 
element and selection of another duty place after end of duty at any place if security elements 
have mobile characteristic, represent the operational behavior of the system. In Tables G.13-
G.18, zone codes and parameters of discrete distribution are presented for each security 
elements according to their characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 motorized on-foot 
1st platoon 0.15 0.85 
2nd platoon 0.25 0.75 
3rd platoon 0.25 0.75 
4th platoon 0.20 0.80 
  stationary mobile 
ambushes 0.70 0.30 
  thermal 
camera 0.70 0.30 
 askarad 0.70 0.30 
 will be used will not be used 
askarad 
thermal 60% 40% 
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Table G.13a. Determination of first duty place of ambushes of 1st platoon 
 
             
 
 
Table G.13b. Determination of  first duty place of ambushes of 2nd platoon 
 
 
Table G.13c. Determination of  first duty place of ambushes of 3rd platoon 
 
Table G.13d. Determination of  first duty place of ambushes of 4th platoon 
probabilities 33% 33% 33% 
with night-vision tool z64z63 z67z66 z71z70 1st ambush without tool z63 z66 z70 
with night-vision tool z75z74 z79z78 z83z82 
4th platoon 
2nd ambush without tool z74 z78 z82 
 
Table G.14. Determination of  first duty place of thermal camera 
probability 11% 
Zone code z3,z12,z22,z32,z42,z54,z58,z70,z79 
 
Table G.15. Determination of  first duty place of askarad 
probability 11% 
Zone code Z10,z46,z80,z90,z91,z92,z93,z94,z95 
 
 
probabilities 25% 25% 25% 25% 
with night-vision tool z1z2 z5z6 z8z9 z11z12 1st ambush without tool z2 z6 z9 z12 
with night-vision tool z14z15 z16z17 z19z20 z20z21 
1st platoon 
2nd ambush without tool z15 z17 z20 z21 
probabilities 33% 33% 33% 
with night-vision tool z26z25 z30z29 z32z31 
probabilities 25% 25% 25% 25% 1
st ambush 
without tool z25 z29 z31 z28 
probabilities 50% 50% 
with night-vision tool z38z37 z41z40 
probabilities 25% 25% 25% 25% 
2nd platoon 
2nd ambush 
without tool z35 z37 z40 z42 
probabilities 33% 33% 33% 
with night-vision tool z46z45 z49z48 z53z52 
probabilities 25% 25% 25% 25% 
1st ambush 
without tool z43 z45 z48 Z52 
probabilities 50% 50% 
with night-vision tool z56z55 z59z58 
probabilities 50% 50% 
3rd platoon 
2nd ambush 
without tool z55 z58 
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Table G.16. Determination of next duty place of thermal camera 
 z3 z12 z22 z32 z42 z54 z58 z70 z79 
z3 --- 0.75 0.25 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
z12 0.50 --- 0.50 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
z22 0.34 0.33 --- 0.33 --- --- --- --- --- 
z32 --- --- 0.50 --- 0.50 --- --- --- --- 
z42 --- --- --- 0.50 --- 0.50 --- --- --- 
z54 --- --- --- --- 0.50 --- 0.50 --- --- 
z58 --- --- --- --- --- 0.50 --- 0.50 --- 
z70 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.50 --- 0.50 
z79 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.30 0.70 --- 
 
Table G.17. Determination of next duty place of askarad 
 z90 z91 z92 z10 z46 z80 z93 z94 z95 
z90 --- 0.75 0.25 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
z91 0.50 --- 0.50 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
z92 --- 0.50 --- 0.50 --- --- --- --- --- 
z10 --- --- 0.35 --- 0.40 0.25 --- --- --- 
z46 --- --- 0.20 0.30 --- 0.30 0.20 --- --- 
z80 --- --- --- 0.25 0.40 --- 0.35 --- --- 
z93 --- --- --- --- --- 0.50 --- 0.50 --- 
z94 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.50 --- 0.50 
z95 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.25 0.75 --- 
 
 Table G.18a. Determination of  next duty place  Table G.18b. Determination of  next duty place                     
     of 1st platoon 1st ambush with night-vision                 of 1st platoon 1st ambush without nightvision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table G.18c. Determination of  next duty place     Table G.18d. Determination of  next duty place 
of 1st platoon 2nd ambush with night-vision                of  1st platoon 2nd ambush without night-vision   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table G.18e. Determination of  next duty place     Table G.18f. Determination of  next duty place 
  of   2nd platoon 1st ambush with night-vision of 2nd platoon 1st ambush without night-vision 
 
 
 
 
 
 z1z2 z5z6 z8z9 z11z12 
z1z2 --- 0.75 0.25 --- 
z5z6 0.50 --- 0.50 --- 
z8z9 --- 0.50 --- 0.50 
z11z12 --- 0.25 0.75 --- 
 z2 z6 z9 z11 
z2 --- 0.75 0.25 --- 
z6 0.50 --- 0.50 --- 
z9 --- 0.50 --- 0.50 
z11 --- 0.25 0.75 --- 
 z14z15 z16z17 z19z20 z20z21
z14z15 --- 0.75 0.25 --- 
z16z17 0.50 --- 0.50 --- 
z19z20 --- 0.50 --- 0.50 
z20z21 --- 0.25 0.75 --- 
 z15 z17 z20 z21 
z15 --- 0.75 0.25 --- 
z17 0.50 --- 0.50 --- 
z20 --- 0.50 --- 0.50 
z21 --- 0.25 0.75 --- 
 z26z25 z30z29 z32z31 
z26z25 --- 0.65 0.35 
z30z29 0.50 --- 0.50 
z32z31 0.35 0.65 --- 
 z26z25 z30z29 z32z31 
z26z25 --- 0.65 0.35 
z30z29 0.50 --- 0.50 
z32z31 0.35 0.65 --- 
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Table G.18g. Determination of  next duty place     Table G.18h. Determination of  next duty place 
of 2nd platoon 2nd  ambush with night-vision             of  2nd platoon 2nd ambush without night-vision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table G.18i. Determination of  next duty place     Table G.18j. Determination of  next duty place 
of 3rd platoon 1st ambush with night-vision          of 3rd platoon 1st ambush without night-vision 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table G.18k. Determination of  next duty place     Table G.18l. Determination of  next duty place 
of 3rd  platoon 2nd  ambush with night-vision               of 3rd platoon 2nd ambush without night-vision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table G.18m. Determination of  next duty place     Table G.18n. Determination of  next duty place 
of 4th  platoon 1st  ambush with night-vision               of 4th platoon 1st ambush without night-vision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table G.18o. Determination of  next duty place     Table G.18p. Determination of  next duty place 
of 4th  platoon 2nd  ambush with night-vision               of 4th platoon 2nd ambush without night-vision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 z38z37 z41z40 
z38z37 --- 1 
z41z40 1 --- 
 z35 z37 z40 z42 
z35 --- 0.75 0.25 --- 
z37 0.50 --- 0.50 --- 
z40 --- 0.50 --- 0.50 
z42 --- 0.25 0.75 --- 
 z43 z45 z48 z52 
z43 --- 0.75 0.25 --- 
z45 0.50 --- 0.50 --- 
z48 --- 0.50 --- 0.50 
z52 --- 0.25 0.75 --- 
 z46z45 z49z48 z53z52 
z46z45 --- 0.65 0.35 
z49z48 0.50 --- 0.50 
z53z52 0.35 0.65 --- 
 z56z55 z59z58 
z56z55 --- 1 
z59z58 1 --- 
 z55 z58 
z55 --- 1 
z58 1 --- 
 z64z63 z67z66 z71z70 
 z64z63 --- 0.65 0.35 
z67z66 0.50 --- 0.50 
z71z70 0.35 0.65 --- 
 z64z63 z67z66 z71z70 
z64z63 --- 0.65 0.35 
z67z66 0.50 --- 0.50 
z71z70 0.35 0.65 --- 
 z75z74 z79z78 z83z88 
z75z74 --- 0.65 0.35 
z79z78 0.50 --- 0.50 
z83z82 0.35 0.65 --- 
 z74 z78 z82 
z74 --- 0.65 0.35 
z78 0.50 --- 0.50 
z82 0.35 0.65 --- 
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